RACC: Representation-Aware Coverage Criteria for LLM Safety Testing
On the map: LLM safety and security → Jailbreaking
Abstract (arXiv)
Large Language Models (LLMs) face severe safety risks from jailbreak attacks, yet current safety testing largely relies on static datasets and lacks systematic criteria to evaluate test suite quality and adequacy. While coverage criteria have proven effective for smaller neural networks, they are impractical for LLMs due to computational overhead and the entanglement of safety-critical signals with irrelevant neuron activations. To address these issues, we propose RACC (Representation-Aware Coverage Criteria), a set of coverage criteria specialized for LLM safety testing. RACC first extracts safety representations from the LLM's hidden states using a small calibration set of harmful prompts, then measures test prompts' concept activations against these directions, and finally computes coverage through six criteria assessing both individual and compositional safety concept coverage. Experiments on multiple LLMs and safety benchmarks show that RACC reliably rewards high-quality jailbreak test suites while remaining insensitive to redundant or invalid inputs, which is a key distinction that neuron-level criteria fail to make. We further demonstrate RACC's practical value in two applications, including test suite prioritization and attack prompt sampling, and validate its generalization across diverse settings and configurations. Overall, RACC provides a scalable and principled foundation for coverage-guided LLM safety testing.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Jailbreaking, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 53 of its 75 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 2 Feb 2026.
Builds on
53 of 75 references.
Closest ancestors · 13
Same direction, newest first
- 2024Understanding the Effectiveness of Coverage Criteria for Large Language Models: A Special Angle from Jailbreak Attacks27 Aug
- 2024PARDEN, Can You Repeat That? Defending against Jailbreaks via Repetition13 May
- 2024Pandora: Jailbreak GPTs by Retrieval Augmented Generation Poisoning13 Feb
- 2023Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queries12 Oct
- 2023Jailbreak and Guard Aligned Language Models with Only Few In-Context Demonstrations10 Oct
- 2023SmoothLLM: Defending Large Language Models Against Jailbreaking Attacks5 Oct
- 2023GPTFUZZER: Red Teaming Large Language Models with Auto-Generated Jailbreak Prompts19 Sep
- 2023Certifying LLM Safety against Adversarial Prompting6 Sep
- 2023Detecting Language Model Attacks with Perplexity27 Aug
- 2023"Do Anything Now": Characterizing and Evaluating In-The-Wild Jailbreak Prompts on Large Language Models7 Aug
- 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models27 Jul
- 2023Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?5 Jul
1 more
Other references · 40
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