mlsanityData to 13 Oct 2026

Cross-LLM Generalization of Behavioral Backdoor Detection in AI Agent Supply Chains

arXiv 2511.19874 ↗First posted 25 Nov 2025cs.CR cs.AI cs.LGcited by 1

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

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Abstract (arXiv)

As AI agents become integral to enterprise workflows, their reliance on shared tool libraries and pre-trained components creates significant supply chain vulnerabilities. While previous work has demonstrated behavioral backdoor detection within individual LLM architectures, the critical question of cross-LLM generalization remains unexplored, a gap with serious implications for organizations deploying multiple AI systems. We present the first systematic study of cross-LLM behavioral backdoor detection, evaluating generalization across six production LLMs (GPT-5.1, Claude Sonnet 4.5, Grok 4.1, Llama 4 Maverick, GPT-OSS 120B, and DeepSeek Chat V3.1). Through 1,198 execution traces and 36 cross-model experiments, we quantify a critical finding: single-model detectors achieve 92.7% accuracy within their training distribution but only 49.2% across different LLMs, a 43.4 percentage point generalization gap equivalent to random guessing. Our analysis reveals that this gap stems from model-specific behavioral signatures, particularly in temporal features (coefficient of variation > 0.8), while structural features remain stable across architectures. We show that model-aware detection incorporating model identity as an additional feature achieves 90.6% accuracy universally across all evaluated models. We release our multi-LLM trace dataset and detection framework to enable reproducible research.

Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 13 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 17 of its 32 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 25 Nov 2025.

Builds on

17 of 32 references.

Closest ancestors · 6

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025Malice in Agentland: Down the Rabbit Hole of Backdoors in the AI Supply Chain3 Oct
  2. 2025LlamaFirewall: An open source guardrail system for building secure AI agents6 May
  3. 2024EIA: Environmental Injection Attack on Generalist Web Agents for Privacy Leakage17 Sep
  4. 2024AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Bases17 Jul
  5. 2024BadAgent: Inserting and Activating Backdoor Attacks in LLM Agents5 Jun
  6. 2024Sleeper Agents: Training Deceptive LLMs that Persist Through Safety Training10 Jan

Other references · 11

  1. 2023AgentBench: Evaluating LLMs as Agentscited by 1,242
  2. 2017BadNets: Identifying Vulnerabilities in the Machine Learning Model Supply Chaincited by 1,099
  3. 2018Spectral Signatures in Backdoor Attackscited by 481
  4. 2024WorkArena: How Capable Are Web Agents at Solving Common Knowledge Work Tasks?cited by 358
  5. 2019Deep Learning for Anomaly Detection: A Surveycited by 357
  6. 2023Poisoning Web-Scale Training Datasets is Practicalcited by 287
  7. 2023Poisoning Language Models During Instruction Tuningcited by 265
  8. 2024The BrowserGym Ecosystem for Web Agent Researchcited by 157
  9. 2023Backdoor Attacks for In-Context Learning with Language Modelscited by 96
  10. 2020Trojaning Language Models for Fun and Profitcited by 90
  11. 2024Best-of-Venom: Attacking RLHF by Injecting Poisoned Preference Datacited by 34

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Cited by year (2026 to 13 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.

1 paper.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2025Breaking Agent Backbones: Evaluating the Security of Backbone LLMs in AI Agents
  2. 2026BackdoorAgent: A Unified Framework for Backdoor Attacks on LLM-based Agents
  3. 2026Detection of adversarial intent in Human-AI teams using LLMs
  4. 2026Autonomous LLM Agent Worms: Cross-Platform Propagation, Automated Discovery and Temporal Re-Entry Defense
  5. 2026Behavioral Integrity Verification for AI Agent Skills
  6. 2026SkillVetBench: LLM-as-Judge for Multi-Dimensional Security Risk Evaluation in Open-Source LLM Agent Skills
  7. 2026BELLS-O: Evaluating the Operational Trade-offs of LLM Supervision Systems
  8. 2026Sleeper Cell: Injecting Latent Malice Temporal Backdoors into Tool-Using LLMs