Breaking Agent Backbones: Evaluating the Security of Backbone LLMs in AI Agents
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
AI agents powered by large language models (LLMs) are being deployed at scale, yet we lack a systematic understanding of how the choice of backbone LLM affects agent security. The non-deterministic sequential nature of AI agents complicates security modeling, while the integration of traditional software with AI components entangles novel LLM vulnerabilities with conventional security risks. Existing frameworks only partially address these challenges as they either capture specific vulnerabilities only or require modeling of complete agents. To address these limitations, we introduce threat snapshots: a framework that isolates specific states in an agent's execution flow where LLM vulnerabilities manifest, enabling the systematic identification and categorization of security risks that propagate from the LLM to the agent level. We apply this framework to construct the b3 benchmark, a security benchmark based on 194,331 unique crowdsourced adversarial attacks. We then evaluate 34 popular LLMs with it, revealing, among other insights, that enhanced reasoning capabilities improve security, while model size does not correlate with security. We release our benchmark, dataset, and evaluation code to facilitate widespread adoption by LLM providers and practitioners, offering guidance for agent developers and incentivizing model developers to prioritize backbone security improvements.
Key facts. Cited by 8 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 15 of its 25 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 26 Oct 2025.
Builds on
15 of 25 references.
Closest ancestors · 7
Same direction, newest first
- 2025Security Challenges in AI Agent Deployment: Insights from a Large Scale Public Competition28 Jul
- 2025WASP: Benchmarking Web Agent Security Against Prompt Injection Attacks22 Apr
- 2025Adaptive Attacks Break Defenses Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on LLM Agents27 Feb
- 2024AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents11 Oct
- 2024Prompt Infection: LLM-to-LLM Prompt Injection within Multi-Agent Systems9 Oct
- 2024Agent Security Bench (ASB): Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in LLM-based Agents3 Oct
- 2024InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents5 Mar
Other references · 8
- 2022ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Modelscited by 8,695
- 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,443
- 2024HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusalcited by 1,429
- 2024Great, Now Write an Article About That: The Crescendo Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreak Attackcited by 390
- 2023Benchmarking and Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on Large Language Modelscited by 264
- 2023Demystifying RCE Vulnerabilities in LLM-Integrated Appscited by 37
- 2023A Security Risk Taxonomy for Prompt-Based Interaction With Large Language Modelscited by 12
- 2025Gandalf the Red: Adaptive Security for LLMscited by 7
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 8.
8 papers.
- 2026The 2025 AI Agent Index: Documenting Technical and Safety Features of Deployed Agentic AI Systemscited by 30
- 2026How Vulnerable Are AI Agents to Indirect Prompt Injections? Insights from a Large-Scale Public Competitioncited by 17
- 2026GPT-Red: Automated Red Teaming via Self-Play at Scalecited by 8
- 2026Architecting Trust in Artificial Epistemic Agentscited by 3
- 2026Parallax: Why AI Agents That Think Must Never Actcited by 2
- 2026Adaptive Adversaries: A Multi-Turn, Multi-LLM Benchmark for LLM Agent Securitycited by 2
- 2026Whose Agent Are You? Multi-Layer Fingerprinting and Attribution of Autonomous Web Agentscited by 1
- 2026TRAP: Tool-result Replay Attack for Probing Misbinding in LLM Agentscited by 0
- 2026TRAP: Tool-result Replay Attack for Probing Misbinding in LLM Agents12 Oct 2026
- 2026GPT-Red: Automated Red Teaming via Self-Play at Scale28 Jul 2026
- 2026Adaptive Adversaries: A Multi-Turn, Multi-LLM Benchmark for LLM Agent Security20 Jul 2026
- 2026Whose Agent Are You? Multi-Layer Fingerprinting and Attribution of Autonomous Web Agents18 Jun 2026
- 2026Parallax: Why AI Agents That Think Must Never Act14 Apr 2026
- 2026How Vulnerable Are AI Agents to Indirect Prompt Injections? Insights from a Large-Scale Public Competition16 Mar 2026
- 2026Architecting Trust in Artificial Epistemic Agents3 Mar 2026
- 2026The 2025 AI Agent Index: Documenting Technical and Safety Features of Deployed Agentic AI Systems19 Feb 2026
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2025Commercial LLM Agents Are Already Vulnerable to Simple Yet Dangerous Attacks
- 2025The Dark Side of LLMs: Agent-based Attack Vectors for System-level Compromise
- 2026Adversarial Attacks in Multi-Agent LLM Pipelines: Unveiling Structural Vulnerabilities in Agentic AI Architectures
- 2026On Understanding, Identifying, and Mitigating Vulnerabilities in Agentic Large Language Models
- 2025TAMAS: Benchmarking Adversarial Risks in Multi-Agent LLM Systems
- 2024Targeting the Core: A Simple and Effective Method to Attack RAG-based Agents via Direct LLM Manipulation
- 2025Bridging AI and Software Security: A Comparative Vulnerability Assessment of LLM Agent Deployment Paradigms
- 2026Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation