mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

SkillVetBench: LLM-as-Judge for Multi-Dimensional Security Risk Evaluation in Open-Source LLM Agent Skills

arXiv 2606.15899 ↗First posted 14 Jun 2026cs.CR cs.AI cs.HCcited by 4

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

Open-source LLM agent ecosystems are growing rapidly, yet the security of community-contributed skills - modular tool definitions that extend agent capabilities - remains largely unvetted. The gap we fill: existing scanners operate at the code layer and are structurally blind to instruction-layer and multi-agent risk - natural-language directives that hijack an agent, exfiltrate data through encoded side channels, or chain harm across pipelines - so what is needed is a semantic, multi-dimensional vetting system rather than another signature matcher. We present SKILLVETBENCH, a live public leaderboard on Hugging Face that uses an LLM-as-Judge to vet agent skills. What is new: SARS (Skill Agentic Risk Score), a five-dimensional agentic-risk metric with a principled weighted formula for instruction-following systems. What is integrated: full CVSS v4.0 vector decomposition and a ClawHub dual-view that places our LLM-generated review beside the official marketplace verdict. What is demonstrated: drawing on our companion benchmark paper [ 1], the LLM-as-Judge stage achieves zero false negatives across 78 confirmed-malicious skills and zero false positives across 22 benign controls, while the best static baseline (SKILLSIEVE) still misses 15%; for instruction-layer categories such as Prompt Injection and Memory Poisoning, conventional tools miss between 89% and 100% of threats (e.g., CODEBERT detects none of nine memory-poisoning skills). Detection rates vary from 35% to 95% across four LLM evaluators, motivating ensemble scoring in production deployments.

Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 2 of its 5 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 14 Jun 2026.

Builds on

2 of 5 references.

Closest ancestors · 1

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026Benchmarking Security Risk Detection and Verification in Open Agentic Skill Ecosystems30 May

Other references · 1

  1. 2019SuperGLUE: A Stickier Benchmark for General-Purpose Language Understanding Systemscited by 1,718

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Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 4.

4 papers.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026When Safe Skills Collide: Measuring Compositional Risk in Agent Skill Ecosystems
  2. 2026OpenSkillRisk: Benchmarking Agent Safety When Using Real-World Risky Third-Party Skills
  3. 2026Skill-Inject: Measuring Agent Vulnerability to Skill File Attacks
  4. 2026MaliciousSkillBench: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Malicious Agent Skill Detection
  5. 2026SkillsMetric: Mapping the Detection Boundary of Static Analysis for Malicious Agent Skills
  6. 2026Pretext: Defeating Malicious Skill Detection Frameworks for AI Agents
  7. 2026SkillProbe: Security Auditing for Emerging Agent Skill Marketplaces via Multi-Agent Collaboration
  8. 2026Behavioral Integrity Verification for AI Agent Skills