HAMLOCK: HArdware-Model LOgically Combined attacK
On the map: LLM safety and security → Backdoor and data poisoning attacks
Abstract (arXiv)
The growing use of third-party hardware accelerators (e.g., FPGAs, ASICs) for deep neural networks (DNNs) introduces new security vulnerabilities. Conventional model-level backdoor attacks, which only poison a model's weights to misclassify inputs with a specific trigger, are often detectable because the entire attack logic is embedded within the model (i.e., software), creating a traceable layer-by-layer activation path. This paper introduces the HArdware-Model Logically Combined Attack (HAMLOCK), a far stealthier threat that distributes the attack logic across the hardware-software boundary. The software (model) is now only minimally altered by tuning the activations of few neurons to produce uniquely high activation values when a trigger is present. A malicious hardware Trojan detects those unique activations by monitoring the corresponding neurons' most significant bit or the 8-bit exponents and triggers another hardware Trojan to directly manipulate the final output logits for misclassification. This decoupled design is highly stealthy, as the model itself contains no complete backdoor activation path as in conventional attacks and hence, appears fully benign. Empirically, across benchmarks like MNIST, CIFAR10, GTSRB, and ImageNet, HAMLOCK achieves a near-perfect attack success rate with a negligible clean accuracy drop. More importantly, HAMLOCK circumvents the state-of-the-art model-level defenses without any adaptive optimization. The hardware Trojan is also undetectable, incurring area and power overheads as low as 0.01%, which is easily masked by process and environmental noise. Our findings expose a critical vulnerability at the hardware-software interface, demanding new cross-layer defenses against this emerging threat.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Backdoor and data poisoning attacks, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 39 of its 78 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 22 Oct 2025.
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39 of 78 references.
Closest ancestors · 1
Same direction, newest first
- 2023Setting the Trap: Capturing and Defeating Backdoors in Pretrained Language Models through Honeypots28 Oct
Other references · 38
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