HOB: A Holistically Optimized Bidding Strategy under Heterogeneous Bidding Environments
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Abstract (arXiv)
Optimizing a single advertising campaign across heterogeneous channels is a central challenge in industrial autobidding. Auction mechanisms vary across channels in ranking rules (pure eCPM vs. UE-augmented scoring), pricing formats (first- vs. second-price), and bidding conventions (uniform vs. non-uniform), while advertisers impose shared campaign-level constraints. We propose HOB, which makes marginal cost (MC) computable and alignable across heterogeneous channels, especially for first-price auctions (FPA) with organic-paid coexistence, where existing bidding formulations do not yield a practical aligned MC form. At the global level, HOB derives channel-specific MC forms and coordinates disparate channels through a shared MC target. At the local level, HOB models free-win probability and winning-price uncertainty with a zero-inflated exponential distribution, yielding an efficient surplus-optimal bidding strategy for non-uniform first-price auctions. We show that any interior optimum satisfies MC equalization across channels. Experiments on a controlled offline benchmark, industrial log replay, and large-scale online A/B tests demonstrate that HOB consistently delivers significant performance gains. Deployed on a large-scale commercial DSP, HOB delivers a 3.0% lift in GMV while maintaining return on advertising spend (ROAS) constraints.
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References · 19
- 2017Real-Time Bidding by Reinforcement Learning in Display Advertisingcited by 91
- 2018Real-Time Bidding with Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning in Display Advertisingcited by 65
- 2022Sustainable Online Reinforcement Learning for Auto-biddingcited by 29
- 2021Towards Efficient Auctions in an Auto-bidding Worldcited by 19
- 2021An Efficient Deep Distribution Network for Bid Shading in First-Price Auctionscited by 14
- 2023Multi-channel Autobidding with Budget and ROI Constraintscited by 14
- 2020Bid Shading in The Brave New World of First-Price Auctionscited by 11
- 2015Lift-Based Bidding in Ad Selectioncited by 8
- 2020Bid Shading by Win-Rate Estimation and Surplus Maximizationcited by 8
- 2019Online Causal Inference for Advertising in Real-Time Bidding Auctionscited by 6
- 2020Why Do Competitive Markets Converge to First-Price Auctions?cited by 6
- 2025Multi-Platform Autobidding with and without Predictionscited by 4
7 more
- 2020Unbiased Lift-based Bidding Systemcited by 3
- 2023Multi-Platform Budget Management in Ad Markets with Non-IC Auctionscited by 3
- 2024MEBS: Multi-task End-to-end Bid Shading for Multi-slot Display Advertisingcited by 3
- 2025Beyond Advertising: Mechanism Design for Platform-Wide Marketing Service "QuanZhanTui"cited by 2
- 2023Uniform Pricing vs Pay as Bid in 100%-Renewables Electricity Markets: A Game-theoretical Analysiscited by 1
- 2024Platform Competition in the Autobidding Worldcited by 1
- 2024Double Distributionally Robust Bid Shading for First Price Auctionscited by 1
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