Evaluating & Reducing Deceptive Dialogue From Language Models with Multi-turn RL
Not on the map. Why?
Abstract (arXiv)
Large Language Models (LLMs) interact with millions of people worldwide in applications such as customer support, education and healthcare. However, their ability to produce deceptive outputs, whether intentionally or inadvertently, poses significant safety concerns. The unpredictable nature of LLM behavior, combined with insufficient safeguards against hallucination, misinformation, and user manipulation, makes their misuse a serious, real-world risk. In this paper, we investigate the extent to which LLMs engage in deception within dialogue, and propose the belief misalignment metric to quantify deception. We evaluate deception across four distinct dialogue scenarios, using five established deception detection metrics and our proposed metric. Our findings reveal this novel deception measure correlates more closely with human judgments than any existing metrics we test. Additionally, our benchmarking of eight state-of-the-art models indicates that LLMs naturally exhibit deceptive behavior in approximately 26% of dialogue turns, even when prompted with seemingly benign objectives. When prompted to deceive, LLMs are capable of increasing deceptiveness by as much as 31% relative to baselines. Unexpectedly, models trained with RLHF, the predominant approach for ensuring the safety of widely-deployed LLMs, still exhibit deception at a rate of 43% on average. Given that deception in dialogue is a behavior that develops over an interaction history, its effective evaluation and mitigation necessitates moving beyond single-utterance analyses. We introduce a multi-turn reinforcement learning methodology to fine-tune LLMs to reduce deceptive behaviors, leading to a 77.6% reduction compared to other instruction-tuned models.
Key facts. Cited by 10 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 30 of its 65 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 16 Oct 2025.
Builds on
30 of 65 references.
References · 30
- 2022Training language models to follow instructions with human feedbackcited by 15,971
- 2017Proximal Policy Optimization Algorithmscited by 15,215
- 2023Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arenacited by 8,626
- 2021Finetuned Language Models Are Zero-Shot Learnerscited by 3,780
- 2022Training a Helpful and Harmless Assistant with Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedbackcited by 3,720
- 2021TruthfulQA: Measuring How Models Mimic Human Falsehoodscited by 2,975
- 2022Emergent Abilities of Large Language Modelscited by 2,512
- 2023A Survey on Evaluation of Large Language Modelscited by 1,242
- 2023Enhancing Chat Language Models by Scaling High-quality Instructional Conversationscited by 839
- 2023AlpacaFarm: A Simulation Framework for Methods that Learn from Human Feedbackcited by 748
- 2023Can Large Language Models Be an Alternative to Human Evaluations?cited by 734
- 2024Sleeper Agents: Training Deceptive LLMs that Persist Through Safety Trainingcited by 529
18 more
- 2023A Survey on Large Language Model (LLM) Security and Privacy: The Good, the Bad, and the Uglycited by 387
- 2023Exploring Large Language Models for Communication Games: An Empirical Study on Werewolfcited by 241
- 2017Deal or No Deal? End-to-End Learning for Negotiation Dialoguescited by 209
- 2019Persuasion for Good: Towards a Personalized Persuasive Dialogue System for Social Goodcited by 209
- 2023AI Deception: A Survey of Examples, Risks, and Potential Solutionscited by 188
- 2023Do the Rewards Justify the Means? Measuring Trade-Offs Between Rewards and Ethical Behavior in the MACHIAVELLI Benchmarkcited by 182
- 2021Alignment of Language Agentscited by 168
- 2018Decoupling Strategy and Generation in Negotiation Dialoguescited by 162
- 2023Large Language Models can Strategically Deceive their Users when Put Under Pressurecited by 146
- 2023User Behavior Simulation with Large Language Model based Agentscited by 140
- 2024Language Models Learn to Mislead Humans via RLHFcited by 124
- 2023Deception Abilities Emerged in Large Language Modelscited by 101
- 2023How to Catch an AI Liar: Lie Detection in Black-Box LLMs by Asking Unrelated Questionscited by 83
- 2024Measuring Bargaining Abilities of LLMs: A Benchmark and A Buyer-Enhancement Methodcited by 48
- 2023Hoodwinked: Deception and Cooperation in a Text-Based Game for Language Modelscited by 47
- 2024AI-LieDar: Examine the Trade-off Between Utility and Truthfulness in LLM Agentscited by 31
- 2024Language Models can Subtly Deceive Without Lying: A Case Study on Strategic Phrasing in Legislationcited by 10
- 2024Towards Safe and Honest AI Agents with Neural Self-Other Overlapcited by 6
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 10.
10 papers.
- 2026The Truthfulness Spectrum Hypothesiscited by 8
- 2026SPADE-Bench: Evaluating Spontaneous Strategic Deception in Agents via Plan-Action Divergencecited by 1
- 2026Adversarial Robustness of Activation Steering in Large Language Modelscited by 1
- 2026Scaling Trends for Lie Detector Oversight in Preference Learningcited by 1
- 2026To Lie or Not to Lie? Investigating The Biased Spread of Global Lies by LLMscited by 0
- 2026When Agents Lie: Premeditation, Persistence, and Exploitation in Repeated Gamescited by 0
- 2026Towards Mitigating Deceptive Safety Alignment in Large Reasoning Modelscited by 0
- 2026Deception by Omission: Language Models Knowingly Hide Their Mistakescited by 0
- 2026Training User Simulators with Latent Intrinsic Feedbackcited by 0
- 2026Understanding and Reducing Misalignment in Persuasion Optimizationcited by 0
- 2026Understanding and Reducing Misalignment in Persuasion Optimization12 Oct 2026
- 2026Training User Simulators with Latent Intrinsic Feedback9 Oct 2026
- 2026Deception by Omission: Language Models Knowingly Hide Their Mistakes8 Oct 2026
- 2026Towards Mitigating Deceptive Safety Alignment in Large Reasoning Models28 Sep 2026
- 2026When Agents Lie: Premeditation, Persistence, and Exploitation in Repeated Games6 Jul 2026
- 2026Scaling Trends for Lie Detector Oversight in Preference Learning2 Jul 2026
- 2026Adversarial Robustness of Activation Steering in Large Language Models5 Jun 2026
- 2026SPADE-Bench: Evaluating Spontaneous Strategic Deception in Agents via Plan-Action Divergence1 Jun 2026
- 2026To Lie or Not to Lie? Investigating The Biased Spread of Global Lies by LLMs8 Apr 2026
- 2026The Truthfulness Spectrum Hypothesis23 Feb 2026
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2025Beyond Prompt-Induced Lies: Investigating LLM Deception on Benign Prompts
- 2025Hidden in Plain Sight: Evaluation of the Deception Detection Capabilities of LLMs in Multimodal Settings
- 2025Can LLMs Lie? Investigation beyond Hallucination
- 2025Debate with Images: Detecting Deceptive Behaviors in Multimodal Large Language Models
- 2024Speak Out of Turn: Safety Vulnerability of Large Language Models in Multi-turn Dialogue
- 2025LLM Can be a Dangerous Persuader: Empirical Study of Persuasion Safety in Large Language Models
- 2026DecepEval: A Benchmark for Evaluating Deception in LLM Agents
- 2024A Survey on the Honesty of Large Language Models