Are LLMs Reliable Rankers? Rank Manipulation via Two-Stage Token Optimization
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Abstract (arXiv)
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as rerankers in information retrieval, yet their ranking behavior can be steered by small, natural-sounding prompts. To expose this vulnerability, we present Rank Anything First (RAF), a two-stage token optimization method that crafts concise textual perturbations to consistently promote a target item in LLM-generated rankings while remaining hard to detect. Stage 1 uses Greedy Coordinate Gradient to shortlist candidate tokens at the current position by combining the gradient of the rank-target with a readability score; Stage 2 evaluates those candidates under exact ranking and readability losses using an entropy-based dynamic weighting scheme, and selects a token via temperature-controlled sampling. RAF generates ranking-promoting prompts token-by-token, guided by dual objectives: maximizing ranking effectiveness and preserving linguistic naturalness. Experiments across multiple LLMs show that RAF significantly boosts the rank of target items using naturalistic language, with greater robustness than existing methods in both promoting target items and maintaining naturalness. These findings underscore a critical security implication: LLM-based reranking is inherently susceptible to adversarial manipulation, raising new challenges for the trustworthiness and robustness of modern retrieval systems. Our code is available at: https://github.com/glad-lab/RAF.
Key facts. Cited by 9 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 15 of its 24 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 8 Oct 2025.
Builds on
15 of 24 references.
References · 15
- 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Modelscited by 3,104
- 2023Prompt Injection attack against LLM-integrated Applicationscited by 605
- 2023A Survey on Large Language Models for Recommendationcited by 379
- 2023Large Language Models are Effective Text Rankers with Pairwise Ranking Promptingcited by 307
- 2024Optimization-based Prompt Injection Attack to LLM-as-a-Judgecited by 143
- 2023Beyond Yes and No: Improving Zero-Shot LLM Rankers via Scoring Fine-Grained Relevance Labelscited by 86
- 2021The Expando-Mono-Duo Design Pattern for Text Ranking with Pretrained Sequence-to-Sequence Modelscited by 81
- 2025A Survey on LLM-powered Agents for Recommender Systemscited by 50
- 2024Ranking Manipulation for Conversational Search Enginescited by 26
- 2025CheatAgent: Attacking LLM-Empowered Recommender Systems via LLM Agentcited by 25
- 2024Stealthy Attack on Large Language Model based Recommendationcited by 19
- 2024LLM Whisperer: An Inconspicuous Attack to Bias LLM Responsescited by 15
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 9.
9 papers.
- 2026FinCARDS: Card-Based Analyst Reranking for Financial Document Question Answeringcited by 16
- 2026Multimodal Generative Engine Optimization: Rank Manipulation for Vision-Language Model Rankerscited by 3
- 2026Controlling Output Rankings in Generative Engines for LLM-based Searchcited by 3
- 2026GEO-Bench: Benchmarking Ranking Manipulation in Generative Engine Optimizationcited by 2
- 2026Do Vision Language Models Understand Human Engagement in Games?cited by 1
- 2026Ranked by Position: Order Sensitivity as an Exploitable Attack Surface in LLM Listwise Recommenderscited by 1
- 2026Position: Recommender Systems Should Move Beyond Platform-Centric Ranking toward Personal Agent-Mediated Recommendationcited by 1
- 2026The Vulnerability of LLM Rankers to Prompt Injection Attackscited by 0
- 2026The Safeguard Worked. Is the LLM System Safer?cited by 0
- 2026The Safeguard Worked. Is the LLM System Safer?1 Sep 2026
- 2026Ranked by Position: Order Sensitivity as an Exploitable Attack Surface in LLM Listwise Recommenders26 Jul 2026
- 2026Position: Recommender Systems Should Move Beyond Platform-Centric Ranking toward Personal Agent-Mediated Recommendation21 Jul 2026
- 2026GEO-Bench: Benchmarking Ranking Manipulation in Generative Engine Optimization27 May 2026
- 2026Do Vision Language Models Understand Human Engagement in Games?19 Mar 2026
- 2026The Vulnerability of LLM Rankers to Prompt Injection Attacks18 Feb 2026
- 2026Controlling Output Rankings in Generative Engines for LLM-based Search3 Feb 2026
- 2026Multimodal Generative Engine Optimization: Rank Manipulation for Vision-Language Model Rankers18 Jan 2026
- 2026FinCARDS: Card-Based Analyst Reranking for Financial Document Question Answering11 Jan 2026