Incident Analysis for AI Agents
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Abstract (arXiv)
As AI agents become more widely deployed, we are likely to see an increasing number of incidents: events involving AI agent use that directly or indirectly cause harm. For example, agents could be prompt-injected to exfiltrate private information or make unauthorized purchases. Structured information about such incidents (e.g., user prompts) can help us understand their causes and prevent future occurrences. However, existing incident reporting processes are not sufficient for understanding agent incidents. In particular, such processes are largely based on publicly available data, which excludes useful, but potentially sensitive, information such as an agent's chain of thought or browser history. To inform the development of new, emerging incident reporting processes, we propose an incident analysis framework for agents. Drawing on systems safety approaches, our framework proposes three types of factors that can cause incidents: system-related (e.g., CBRN training data), contextual (e.g., prompt injections), and cognitive (e.g., misunderstanding a user request). We also identify specific information that could help clarify which factors are relevant to a given incident: activity logs, system documentation and access, and information about the tools an agent uses. We provide recommendations for 1) what information incident reports should include and 2) what information developers and deployers should retain and make available to incident investigators upon request. As we transition to a world with more agents, understanding agent incidents will become increasingly crucial for managing risks.
Key facts. Cited by 5 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 17 of its 31 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 19 Aug 2025.
Builds on
17 of 31 references.
References · 17
- 2022Training language models to follow instructions with human feedbackcited by 15,971
- 2021TruthfulQA: Measuring How Models Mimic Human Falsehoodscited by 2,975
- 2020Extracting Training Data from Large Language Modelscited by 2,189
- 2023Language Models Don't Always Say What They Think: Unfaithful Explanations in Chain-of-Thought Promptingcited by 1,122
- 2023Towards Understanding Sycophancy in Language Modelscited by 1,040
- 2023An Empirical Study of Catastrophic Forgetting in Large Language Models During Continual Fine-tuningcited by 639
- 2024LoRA Learns Less and Forgets Lesscited by 328
- 2023ChatGPT Beyond English: Towards a Comprehensive Evaluation of Large Language Models in Multilingual Learningcited by 206
- 2024A Note on Shumailov et al. (2024): `AI Models Collapse When Trained on Recursively Generated Data'cited by 115
- 2024Be like a Goldfish, Don't Memorize! Mitigating Memorization in Generative LLMscited by 50
- 2020Hidden Incentives for Auto-Induced Distributional Shiftcited by 43
- 2025Characterizing AI Agents for Alignment and Governancecited by 30
5 more
- 2023Power-seeking can be probable and predictive for trained agentscited by 25
- 2022A taxonomic system for failure cause analysis of open source AI incidentscited by 9
- 2024CoPrompter: User-Centric Evaluation of LLM Instruction Alignment for Improved Prompt Engineeringcited by 8
- 2024Lessons for Editors of AI Incidents from the AI Incident Databasecited by 5
- 2025Securing External Deeper-than-black-box GPAI Evaluationscited by 2
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2025: 1; 2026: 4.
5 papers.
- 2025Distributional AGI Safetycited by 12
- 2026When Errors Become Narratives: A Longitudinal Taxonomy of Silent Failures in a Production LLM Agent Runtimecited by 2
- 2026Physiological Noise Augmentation Improves Non-Invasive Brain-to-Speechcited by 0
- 2026When Agents Act Unwatched: The Reduced-Supervision Paradox in Agentic AIcited by 0
- 2026Evaluating Language Model Safety Across Long Adversarial Conversationscited by 0
- 2026Evaluating Language Model Safety Across Long Adversarial Conversations29 Sep 2026
- 2026When Agents Act Unwatched: The Reduced-Supervision Paradox in Agentic AI28 Aug 2026
- 2026Physiological Noise Augmentation Improves Non-Invasive Brain-to-Speech6 Jul 2026
- 2026When Errors Become Narratives: A Longitudinal Taxonomy of Silent Failures in a Production LLM Agent Runtime12 Jun 2026
- 2025Distributional AGI Safety18 Dec 2025
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026"What Did It Actually Do?": Understanding Risk Awareness and Traceability for Computer-Use Agents
- 2026Owner-Harm: A Missing Threat Model for AI Agent Safety
- 2025The AI Agent Index
- 2026The Blind Spot of Agent Safety: How Benign User Instructions Expose Critical Vulnerabilities in Computer-Use Agents
- 2024Exploring LLM-based Agents for Root Cause Analysis
- 2024Safeguarding AI Agents: Developing and Analyzing Safety Architectures
- 2026Detecting Offensive Cyber Agents: A Detection-in-Depth Approach
- 2026An Evaluation of Data Leakage Risks in Tool-Using LLM Agents in Realistic Scenarios