mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Discovering Expert-Level Nash Equilibrium Algorithms with Large Language Models

arXiv 2508.11874 ↗First posted 16 Aug 2025cs.GT cs.AI cs.DScited by 1

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Abstract (arXiv)

Designing polynomial-time algorithms for approximate Nash equilibria (ANE) with provable worst-case guarantees is a fundamental open problem in algorithmic game theory. While large language models (LLMs) can generate candidate algorithms at scale, certifying worst-case guarantees requires formal analysis over all game instances -- a task for which no automated system previously existed. Here, we present LegoNE, a framework encoding expert proof strategies into a symbolic language that automatically compiles any candidate algorithm into a finite optimization problem certifying its worst-case guarantee. Integrating LegoNE with a reasoning LLM, we rediscovered an algorithm matching the best polynomial-time guarantee for two-player games, and discovered a three-player algorithm improving the best guarantee from 0.6+δ to 0.5+δ -- provably beyond the reach of the extension technique, the only previously known multi-player ANE design paradigm. These results show that encoding domain-specific proof strategies into a machine-tractable language can support LLM-driven discovery of algorithms outside known human design paradigms.

Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 16 of its 69 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 16 Aug 2025.

Builds on

16 of 69 references.

References · 16

  1. 2025DeepSeek-R1: Incentivizing Reasoning Capability in LLMs via Reinforcement Learningcited by 6,330
  2. 2025Gemini 2.5: Pushing the Frontier with Advanced Reasoning, Multimodality, Long Context, and Next Generation Agentic Capabilitiescited by 3,796
  3. 2025AlphaEvolve: A coding agent for scientific and algorithmic discoverycited by 867
  4. 2025Gold-medalist Performance in Solving Olympiad Geometry with AlphaGeometry2cited by 97
  5. 2016Settling the complexity of computing approximate two-player Nash equilibriacited by 31
  6. 2024Steering Language Models with Game-Theoretic Solverscited by 28
  7. 2019How much data is sufficient to learn high-performing algorithms? Generalization guarantees for data-driven algorithm designcited by 27
  8. 2019Estimating Approximate Incentive Compatibilitycited by 7
  9. 2022Pure-Circuit: Tight Inapproximability for PPADcited by 7
  10. 2025From Natural Language to Extensive-Form Game Representationscited by 6
  11. 2014Computing Approximate Nash Equilibria in Polymatrix Gamescited by 5
  12. 2022A Polynomial-Time Algorithm for 1/3-Approximate Nash Equilibria in Bimatrix Gamescited by 5
4 more
  1. 2015Distributed Methods for Computing Approximate Equilibriacited by 3
  2. 2023A survey on algorithms for Nash equilibria in finite normal-form gamescited by 3
  3. 2022A Polynomial-Time Algorithm for 1/2-Well-Supported Nash Equilibria in Bimatrix Gamescited by 1
  4. 2024Verifying Approximate Equilibrium in Auctionscited by 1

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Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.

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  1. 2026Modular Discovery of General Game-Playing Algorithms with Large Language Models
  2. 2026A Theoretical Framework for Self-Play Theorem Proving Algorithms
  3. 2026Solver-Guided Reasoning for Mixed-Equilibrium Strategies
  4. 2025Reasoning and Behavioral Equilibria in LLM-Nash Games: From Mindsets to Actions
  5. 2025STP: Self-play LLM Theorem Provers with Iterative Conjecturing and Proving
  6. 2025Code World Models for General Game Playing
  7. 2026TCSAlgBench: Benchmarking Automated Proving for Research-Level Theoretical Computer Science
  8. 2025From Debate to Equilibrium: Belief-Driven Multi-Agent LLM Reasoning via Bayesian Nash Equilibrium