Manipulation Attacks by Misaligned AI: Risk Analysis and Safety Case Framework
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Abstract (arXiv)
Frontier AI systems are rapidly advancing in their capabilities to persuade, deceive, and influence human behaviour, with current models already demonstrating human-level persuasion and strategic deception in specific contexts. Humans are often the weakest link in cybersecurity systems, and a misaligned AI system deployed internally within a frontier company may seek to undermine human oversight by manipulating employees. Despite this growing threat, manipulation attacks have received little attention, and no systematic framework exists for assessing and mitigating these risks. To address this, we provide a detailed explanation of why manipulation attacks are a significant threat and could lead to catastrophic outcomes. Additionally, we present a safety case framework for manipulation risk, structured around three core lines of argument: inability, control, and trustworthiness. For each argument, we specify evidence requirements, evaluation methodologies, and implementation considerations for direct application by AI companies. This paper provides the first systematic methodology for integrating manipulation risk into AI safety governance, offering AI companies a concrete foundation to assess and mitigate these threats before deployment.
Key facts. Cited by 5 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 32 of its 56 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 17 Jul 2025.
Builds on
32 of 56 references.
References · 32
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20 more
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Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 5.
5 papers.
- 2026Evaluating Language Models for Harmful Manipulationcited by 6
- 2026How to Count AIs: Individuation and Liability for AI Agentscited by 5
- 2026Questionnaire Responses Do not Capture the Safety of AI Agentscited by 0
- 2026On Understanding, Identifying, and Mitigating Vulnerabilities in Agentic Large Language Modelscited by 0
- 2026AI Persuasion as a Threat to Human Controlcited by 0
- 2026AI Persuasion as a Threat to Human Control13 Sep 2026
- 2026On Understanding, Identifying, and Mitigating Vulnerabilities in Agentic Large Language Models11 Aug 2026
- 2026Evaluating Language Models for Harmful Manipulation26 Mar 2026
- 2026Questionnaire Responses Do not Capture the Safety of AI Agents15 Mar 2026
- 2026How to Count AIs: Individuation and Liability for AI Agents24 Feb 2026