AI Persuasion as a Threat to Human Control
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Abstract (arXiv)
The threat that AI persuasion poses to human control has been acknowledged in the literature, but not yet systematically studied. Now that persuasion attacks are no longer theoretical - with Anthropic's Claude Mythos 5 recently making headlines for trying to convince people involved in an open-source project to merge malicious code during an evaluation - there is a pressing need to deeply analyze this threat. We undertake that effort here. In particular, we analyze how AI could persuade humans in key settings (e.g. safety-relevant R&D within frontier labs) toward decisions that compromise the development, containment, oversight, and governance of AI itself. In doing so, we elucidate a framework for characterizing this threat, develop five concrete scenarios using this framework, and provide a blueprint for assessing the associated risks. Using this blueprint, we conduct an initial risk estimation survey with select researchers and find that their opinions on which scenarios are riskiest are highly mixed. Their disagreements stem from differing opinions about the effectiveness of AI persuasion in different contexts, and point to the need for follow-up risk elicitation studies and persuasion evaluations, which we outline. Our hope is that this paper highlights the risks from AI persuasion undermining control, and provides a path forward for future research.
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References · 20
- 2024Frontier Models are Capable of In-context Schemingcited by 252
- 2023AI Control: Improving Safety Despite Intentional Subversioncited by 207
- 2025Why human-AI relationships need socioaffective alignmentcited by 47
- 2024Sabotage Evaluations for Frontier Modelscited by 45
- 2025It's the Thought that Counts: Evaluating the Attempts of Frontier LLMs to Persuade on Harmful Topicscited by 13
- 2026Evaluating whether AI models would sabotage AI safety researchcited by 7
- 2020Human Cognition through the Lens of Social Engineering Cyberattackscited by 6
- 2025Systematic Hazard Analysis for Frontier AI using STPAcited by 6
- 2025Designing Incident Reporting Systems for Harms from General-Purpose AIcited by 6
- 2026Human oversight of agentic systems in practice: Examining the oversight work, challenges, and heuristics of developers using software agentscited by 6
- 2026Propensity Inference: Environmental Contributors to LLM Behaviourcited by 5
- 2025Mapping AI Benchmark Data to Quantitative Risk Estimates Through Expert Elicitationcited by 4
8 more
- 2025Manipulation Attacks by Misaligned AI: Risk Analysis and Safety Case Frameworkcited by 4
- 2026Coding with "Enemy": Can Human Developers Detect AI Agent Sabotage?cited by 4
- 2026AI systems out-persuade expert humanscited by 4
- 2025The Loss of Control Playbook: Degrees, Dynamics, and Preparednesscited by 3
- 2025The Role of Risk Modeling in Advanced AI Risk Managementcited by 2
- 2025A Methodology for Quantitative AI Risk Modelingcited by 2
- 2026Auditing Sabotage Bench: A Benchmark for Detecting and Fixing Research Sabotage in ML Codebasescited by 2
- 2025"I know it's not right, but that's what it said to do": Investigating Trust in AI Chatbots for Cybersecurity Policycited by 1
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