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Incorporating Failure of Machine Learning in Dynamic Probabilistic Safety Assurance

arXiv 2506.06868 ↗First posted 7 Jun 2025cs.AIcited by 0

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Abstract (arXiv)

Machine Learning (ML) models are increasingly integrated into safety-critical systems, such as autonomous vehicle platooning, to enable real-time decision-making. However, their inherent imperfection introduces a new class of failure: reasoning failures often triggered by distributional shifts between operational and training data. Traditional safety assessment methods, which rely on design artefacts or code, are ill-suited for ML components that learn behaviour from data. SafeML was recently proposed to dynamically detect such shifts and assign confidence levels to the reasoning of ML-based components. Building on this, we introduce a probabilistic safety assurance framework that integrates SafeML with Bayesian Networks (BNs) to model ML failures as part of a broader causal safety analysis. This allows for dynamic safety evaluation and system adaptation under uncertainty. We demonstrate the approach on an simulated automotive platooning system with traffic sign recognition. The findings highlight the potential broader benefits of explicitly modelling ML failures in safety assessment.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 3 of its 24 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 7 Jun 2025.

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3 of 24 references.

References · 3

  1. 2020SafeML: Safety Monitoring of Machine Learning Classifiers through Statistical Difference Measurecited by 16
  2. 2023Explaining black boxes with a SMILE: Statistical Model-agnostic Interpretability with Local Explanationscited by 8
  3. 2023Scope Compliance Uncertainty Estimatecited by 3

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