Remote Rowhammer Attack using Adversarial Observations on Federated Learning Clients
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Abstract (arXiv)
Federated Learning (FL) has the potential for simultaneous global learning amongst a large number of parallel agents, enabling emerging AI such as LLMs to be trained across demographically diverse data. Central to this being efficient is the ability for FL to perform sparse gradient updates and remote direct memory access at the central server. Most of the research in FL security focuses on protecting data privacy at the edge client or in the communication channels between the client and server. Client-facing attacks on the server are less well investigated as the assumption is that a large collective of clients offer resilience. Here, we show that by attacking certain clients that lead to a high frequency repetitive memory update in the server, we can remote initiate a rowhammer attack on the server memory. For the first time, we do not need backdoor access to the server, and a reinforcement learning (RL) attacker can learn how to maximize server repetitive memory updates by manipulating the client's sensor observation. The consequence of the remote rowhammer attack is that we are able to achieve bit flips, which can corrupt the server memory. We demonstrate the feasibility of our attack using a large-scale FL automatic speech recognition (ASR) systems with sparse updates, our adversarial attacking agent can achieve around 70% repeated update rate (RUR) in the targeted server model, effectively inducing bit flips on server DRAM. The security implications are that can cause disruptions to learning or may inadvertently cause elevated privilege. This paves the way for further research on practical mitigation strategies in FL and hardware design.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 25 of its 50 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 9 May 2025.
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References · 25
- 2015Deep Residual Learning for Image Recognitioncited by 52,096
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- 2014Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examplescited by 7,364
- 2013Intriguing properties of neural networkscited by 5,155
- 2019Advances and Open Problems in Federated Learningcited by 3,046
- 2020Conformer: Convolution-augmented Transformer for Speech Recognitioncited by 1,863
- 2016Adversarial examples in the physical worldcited by 1,769
- 2019Common Voice: A Massively-Multilingual Speech Corpuscited by 1,384
- 2017Adversarial Patchcited by 517
- 2018Audio Adversarial Examples: Targeted Attacks on Speech-to-Textcited by 274
- 2020Adversarial Camouflage: Hiding Physical-World Attacks with Natural Stylescited by 126
- 2019QuartzNet: Deep Automatic Speech Recognition with 1D Time-Channel Separable Convolutionscited by 94
13 more
- 2018CommanderSong: A Systematic Approach for Practical Adversarial Voice Recognitioncited by 66
- 2022Squeezeformer: An Efficient Transformer for Automatic Speech Recognitioncited by 51
- 2021Efficient conformer: Progressive downsampling and grouped attention for automatic speech recognitioncited by 42
- 2021Citrinet: Closing the Gap between Non-Autoregressive and Autoregressive End-to-End Models for Automatic Speech Recognitioncited by 34
- 2019RowHammer: A Retrospectivecited by 19
- 2020TRRespass: Exploiting the Many Sides of Target Row Refreshcited by 11
- 2015DRAMA: Exploiting DRAM Addressing for Cross-CPU Attackscited by 10
- 2015Rowhammer.js: A Remote Software-Induced Fault Attack in JavaScriptcited by 9
- 2018Nethammer: Inducing Rowhammer Faults through Network Requestscited by 7
- 2021Uncovering In-DRAM RowHammer Protection Mechanisms: A New Methodology, Custom RowHammer Patterns, and Implicationscited by 7
- 2024FedRDMA: Communication-Efficient Cross-Silo Federated LLM via Chunked RDMA Transmissioncited by 5
- 2020Are We Susceptible to Rowhammer? An End-to-End Methodology for Cloud Providerscited by 4
- 2022DRAM Bender: An Extensible and Versatile FPGA-based Infrastructure to Easily Test State-of-the-art DRAM Chipscited by 4
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