Off-Policy Evaluation for Sequential Persuasion Process with Unobserved Confounding

In this paper, we expand the Bayesian persuasion framework to account for unobserved confounding variables in sender-receiver interactions. While traditional models assume that belief updates follow Bayesian principles, real-world scenarios often involve hidden variables that impact the receiver's belief formation and decision-making. We conceptualize this as a sequential decision-making problem, where the sender and receiver interact over multiple rounds. In each round, the sender communicates with the receiver, who also interacts with the environment. Crucially, the receiver's belief update is affected by an unobserved confounding variable. By reformulating this scenario as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP), we capture the sender's incomplete information regarding both the dynamics of the receiver's beliefs and the unobserved confounder. We prove that finding an optimal observation-based policy in this POMDP is equivalent to solving for an optimal signaling strategy in the original persuasion framework. Furthermore, we demonstrate how this reformulation facilitates the application of proximal learning for off-policy evaluation in the persuasion process. This advancement enables the sender to evaluate alternative signaling strategies using only observational data from a behavioral policy, thus eliminating the necessity for costly new experiments.