In-House Evaluation Is Not Enough: Towards Robust Third-Party Flaw Disclosure for General-Purpose AI
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Abstract (arXiv)
The widespread deployment of general-purpose AI (GPAI) systems introduces significant new risks. Yet the infrastructure, practices, and norms for reporting flaws in GPAI systems remain seriously underdeveloped, lagging far behind more established fields like software security. Based on a collaboration between experts from the fields of software security, machine learning, law, social science, and policy, we identify key gaps in the evaluation and reporting of flaws in GPAI systems. We call for three interventions to advance system safety. First, we propose using standardized AI flaw reports and rules of engagement for researchers in order to ease the process of submitting, reproducing, and triaging flaws in GPAI systems. Second, we propose GPAI system providers adopt broadly-scoped flaw disclosure programs, borrowing from bug bounties, with legal safe harbors to protect researchers. Third, we advocate for the development of improved infrastructure to coordinate distribution of flaw reports across the many stakeholders who may be impacted. These interventions are increasingly urgent, as evidenced by the prevalence of jailbreaks and other flaws that can transfer across different providers' GPAI systems. By promoting robust reporting and coordination in the AI ecosystem, these proposals could significantly improve the safety, security, and accountability of GPAI systems.
Key facts. Cited by 7 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 35 of its 104 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 21 Mar 2025.
Builds on
35 of 104 references.
References · 35
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23 more
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Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2025: 4; 2026: 3.
7 papers.
- 2025The 2025 Foundation Model Transparency Indexcited by 11
- 2025The Backfiring Effect of Weak AI Safety Regulationcited by 3
- 2025Red Teaming AI Red Teamingcited by 3
- 2025From Firewalls to Frontiers: AI Red-Teaming is a Domain-Specific Evolution of Cyber Red-Teamingcited by 2
- 2026What Current AI Benchmarks Leave Unmeasured: Modality, Search, Citations, and Implications (for Safety Evaluations)cited by 1
- 2026Designing escalation criteria for international AI incident response: criteria, triggers, and thresholdscited by 0
- 2026FLARE-AI: Flaw Reporting for AIcited by 0
- 2026What Current AI Benchmarks Leave Unmeasured: Modality, Search, Citations, and Implications (for Safety Evaluations)6 Aug 2026
- 2026FLARE-AI: Flaw Reporting for AI30 Jun 2026
- 2026Designing escalation criteria for international AI incident response: criteria, triggers, and thresholds25 Apr 2026
- 2025The 2025 Foundation Model Transparency Index11 Dec 2025
- 2025From Firewalls to Frontiers: AI Red-Teaming is a Domain-Specific Evolution of Cyber Red-Teaming14 Sep 2025
- 2025Red Teaming AI Red Teaming7 Jul 2025
- 2025The Backfiring Effect of Weak AI Safety Regulation26 Mar 2025
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