Strategic Usage in a Multi-Learner Setting
Not on the map. Why?
Abstract (arXiv)
Real-world systems often involve some pool of users choosing between a set of services. With the increase in popularity of online learning algorithms, these services can now self-optimize, leveraging data collected on users to maximize some reward such as service quality. On the flipside, users may strategically choose which services to use in order to pursue their own reward functions, in the process wielding power over which services can see and use their data. Extensive prior research has been conducted on the effects of strategic users in single-service settings, with strategic behavior manifesting in the manipulation of observable features to achieve a desired classification; however, this can often be costly or unattainable for users and fails to capture the full behavior of multi-service dynamic systems. As such, we analyze a setting in which strategic users choose among several available services in order to pursue positive classifications, while services seek to minimize loss functions on their observations. We focus our analysis on realizable settings, and show that naive retraining can still lead to oscillation even if all users are observed at different times; however, if this retraining uses memory of past observations, convergent behavior can be guaranteed for certain loss function classes. We provide results obtained from synthetic and real-world data to empirically validate our theoretical findings.
Key facts. Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 22 of its 43 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 29 Jan 2024.
Builds on
22 of 43 references.
References · 22
- 2016Understanding deep learning requires rethinking generalizationcited by 1,657
- 2018Fairness Without Demographics in Repeated Loss Minimizationcited by 363
- 2020Performative Predictioncited by 318
- 2015Strategic Classificationcited by 256
- 2017Strategic Classification from Revealed Preferencescited by 126
- 2018The Social Cost of Strategic Classificationcited by 105
- 2019Strategic Classification is Causal Modeling in Disguisecited by 92
- 2018How Do Classifiers Induce Agents To Invest Effort Strategically?cited by 82
- 2018The Disparate Effects of Strategic Manipulationcited by 75
- 2021Strategic Classification in the Darkcited by 66
- 2021Who Leads and Who Follows in Strategic Classification?cited by 53
- 2022Multiplayer Performative Prediction: Learning in Decision-Dependent Gamescited by 42
10 more
- 2019Group Retention when Using Machine Learning in Sequential Decision Making: the Interplay between User Dynamics and Fairnesscited by 38
- 2022Multi-agent Performative Prediction: From Global Stability and Optimality to Chaoscited by 33
- 2022Competition, Alignment, and Equilibria in Digital Marketplacescited by 17
- 2019Regression Equilibriumcited by 16
- 2020Competing Bandits: The Perils of Exploration Under Competitioncited by 12
- 2023Strategic Apple Tastingcited by 10
- 2020Coopetition Against an Amazoncited by 6
- 2022Stochastic Saddle Point Problems with Decision-Dependent Distributionscited by 6
- 2022Competition over data: how does data purchase affect users?cited by 5
- 2023Algorithmic Censoring in Dynamic Learning Systemscited by 5
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2024: 2; 2025: 1.
3 papers.
- 2025Learning Classifiers That Induce Markets27 Feb 2025
- 2024Safety vs. Performance: How Multi-Objective Learning Reduces Barriers to Market Entry5 Sep 2024
- 2024Learning from Streaming Data when Users Choose3 Jun 2024