Minimally Modifying a Markov Game to Achieve Any Nash Equilibrium and Value
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Abstract (arXiv)
We study the game modification problem, where a benevolent game designer or a malevolent adversary modifies the reward function of a zero-sum Markov game so that a target deterministic or stochastic policy profile becomes the unique Markov perfect Nash equilibrium and has a value within a target range, in a way that minimizes the modification cost. We characterize the set of policy profiles that can be installed as the unique equilibrium of a game and establish sufficient and necessary conditions for successful installation. We propose an efficient algorithm that solves a convex optimization problem with linear constraints and then performs random perturbation to obtain a modification plan with a near-optimal cost. The code for our algorithm is available at https://github.com/YoungWu559/game-modification .
Key facts. Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 14 of its 52 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 1 Nov 2023.
Builds on
14 of 52 references.
References · 14
- 2017Cycles in adversarial regularized learningcited by 124
- 2020Adaptive Reward-Poisoning Attacks against Reinforcement Learningcited by 86
- 2020Policy Teaching via Environment Poisoning: Training-time Adversarial Attacks against Reinforcement Learningcited by 81
- 2019Policy Poisoning in Batch Reinforcement Learning and Controlcited by 70
- 2019Deceptive Reinforcement Learning Under Adversarial Manipulations on Cost Signalscited by 50
- 2021Reward Poisoning in Reinforcement Learning: Attacks Against Unknown Learners in Unknown Environmentscited by 26
- 2020Policy Teaching in Reinforcement Learning via Environment Poisoning Attackscited by 24
- 2022Understanding the Limits of Poisoning Attacks in Episodic Reinforcement Learningcited by 21
- 2022Reward Poisoning Attacks on Offline Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learningcited by 20
- 2022Admissible Policy Teaching through Reward Designcited by 12
- 2021Game Redesign in No-regret Game Playingcited by 8
- 2021Game Transformations That Preserve Nash Equilibria or Best-Response Setscited by 5
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Citing papers per year: 2024: 1; 2025: 1; 2026: 1.
3 papers.
- 2024Inception: Efficiently Computable Misinformation Attacks on Markov Gamescited by 1
- 2025Optimally Installing Strict Equilibriacited by 0
- 2026Thompson Sampling for Learning in Zero-Sum Gamescited by 0
- 2026Thompson Sampling for Learning in Zero-Sum Games11 Oct 2026
- 2025Optimally Installing Strict Equilibria5 Mar 2025
- 2024Inception: Efficiently Computable Misinformation Attacks on Markov Games24 Jun 2024