Safe Multi-agent Learning via Trapping Regions
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Abstract (arXiv)
One of the main challenges of multi-agent learning lies in establishing convergence of the algorithms, as, in general, a collection of individual, self-serving agents is not guaranteed to converge with their joint policy, when learning concurrently. This is in stark contrast to most single-agent environments, and sets a prohibitive barrier for deployment in practical applications, as it induces uncertainty in long term behavior of the system. In this work, we apply the concept of trapping regions, known from qualitative theory of dynamical systems, to create safety sets in the joint strategy space for decentralized learning. We propose a binary partitioning algorithm for verification that candidate sets form trapping regions in systems with known learning dynamics, and a heuristic sampling algorithm for scenarios where learning dynamics are not known. We demonstrate the applications to a regularized version of Dirac Generative Adversarial Network, a four-intersection traffic control scenario run in a state of the art open-source microscopic traffic simulator SUMO, and a mathematical model of economic competition.
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References · 10
- 2013Playing Atari with Deep Reinforcement Learningcited by 3,211
- 2017Multi-Agent Actor-Critic for Mixed Cooperative-Competitive Environmentscited by 1,519
- 2018Which Training Methods for GANs do actually Converge?cited by 672
- 2017Safe Model-based Reinforcement Learning with Stability Guaranteescited by 347
- 2017A Unified Game-Theoretic Approach to Multiagent Reinforcement Learningcited by 265
- 2018Mean Field Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learningcited by 202
- 2020Neural Lyapunov Controlcited by 142
- 2018Reachability Analysis of Deep Neural Networks with Provable Guaranteescited by 93
- 2021Safe Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning via Shieldingcited by 60
- 2019Computing Approximate Equilibria in Sequential Adversarial Games by Exploitability Descentcited by 31
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