Surprisingly Popular Voting Recovers Rankings, Surprisingly!
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Abstract (arXiv)
The wisdom of the crowd has long become the de facto approach for eliciting information from individuals or experts in order to predict the ground truth. However, classical democratic approaches for aggregating individual votes only work when the opinion of the majority of the crowd is relatively accurate. A clever recent approach, surprisingly popular voting, elicits additional information from the individuals, namely their prediction of other individuals' votes, and provably recovers the ground truth even when experts are in minority. This approach works well when the goal is to pick the correct option from a small list, but when the goal is to recover a true ranking of the alternatives, a direct application of the approach requires eliciting too much information. We explore practical techniques for extending the surprisingly popular algorithm to ranked voting by partial votes and predictions and designing robust aggregation rules. We experimentally demonstrate that even a little prediction information helps surprisingly popular voting outperform classical approaches.
Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 9 of its 57 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 19 May 2021.
Builds on
9 of 57 references.
References · 9
- 2014Spectral Methods meet EM: A Provably Optimal Algorithm for Crowdsourcingcited by 63
- 2013Crowdsourced Judgement Elicitation with Endogenous Proficiencycited by 30
- 2016Informed Truthfulness in Multi-Task Peer Predictioncited by 25
- 2019Dominantly Truthful Multi-task Peer Prediction with a Constant Number of Taskscited by 12
- 2021The Wisdom of the Crowd and Higher-Order Beliefscited by 8
- 2019Forecast Aggregation via Peer Predictioncited by 7
- 2019Peeking Behind the Ordinal Curtain: Improving Distortion via Cardinal Queriescited by 6
- 2019Communication, Distortion, and Randomness in Metric Votingcited by 6
- 2019Awareness of Voter Passion Greatly Improves the Distortion of Metric Social Choicecited by 2
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2021: 1; 2022: 1; 2023: 0; 2024: 1; 2025: 1.
4 papers.
- 2022Multi-winner Approval Voting Goes Epistemiccited by 2
- 2021Truth-tracking via Approval Voting: Size Matterscited by 1
- 2024Surprisingly Popular Voting for Concentric Rank-Order Modelscited by 0
- 2025SP-Rank: A Dataset for Ranked Preferences with Secondary Informationcited by 0
- 2025SP-Rank: A Dataset for Ranked Preferences with Secondary Information17 Oct 2025
- 2024Surprisingly Popular Voting for Concentric Rank-Order Models13 Nov 2024
- 2022Multi-winner Approval Voting Goes Epistemic17 Jan 2022
- 2021Truth-tracking via Approval Voting: Size Matters7 Dec 2021