Low-Variance and Zero-Variance Baselines for Extensive-Form Games
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Abstract (arXiv)
Extensive-form games (EFGs) are a common model of multi-agent interactions with imperfect information. State-of-the-art algorithms for solving these games typically perform full walks of the game tree that can prove prohibitively slow in large games. Alternatively, sampling-based methods such as Monte Carlo Counterfactual Regret Minimization walk one or more trajectories through the tree, touching only a fraction of the nodes on each iteration, at the expense of requiring more iterations to converge due to the variance of sampled values. In this paper, we extend recent work that uses baseline estimates to reduce this variance. We introduce a framework of baseline-corrected values in EFGs that generalizes the previous work. Within our framework, we propose new baseline functions that result in significantly reduced variance compared to existing techniques. We show that one particular choice of such a function --- predictive baseline --- is provably optimal under certain sampling schemes. This allows for efficient computation of zero-variance value estimates even along sampled trajectories.
Key facts. Cited by 9 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 22 Jul 2019.
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Citing papers per year: 2021: 1; 2022: 3; 2023: 1; 2024: 1; 2025: 2; 2026: 1.
9 papers.
- 2022A Unified Approach to Reinforcement Learning, Quantal Response Equilibria, and Two-Player Zero-Sum Gamescited by 64
- 2024A Survey on Self-play Methods in Reinforcement Learningcited by 26
- 2022ESCHER: Eschewing Importance Sampling in Games by Computing a History Value Function to Estimate Regretcited by 24
- 2021Efficient Deviation Types and Learning for Hindsight Rationality in Extensive-Form Gamescited by 14
- 2023Hierarchical Deep Counterfactual Regret Minimizationcited by 4
- 2025On the Power of Perturbation under Sampling in Solving Extensive-Form Gamescited by 1
- 2026AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Gamescited by 1
- 2022Efficient Deviation Types and Learning for Hindsight Rationality in Extensive-Form Games: Correctionscited by 0
- 2025Beyond Game Theory Optimal: Profit-Maximizing Poker Agents for No-Limit Holdemcited by 0
- 2026AV-AIVAT: 74x Cheaper Agent Evaluation with Certified Anytime-Valid Stopping in Imperfect-Information Games6 Aug 2026
- 2025Beyond Game Theory Optimal: Profit-Maximizing Poker Agents for No-Limit Holdem28 Sep 2025
- 2025On the Power of Perturbation under Sampling in Solving Extensive-Form Games28 Jan 2025
- 2024A Survey on Self-play Methods in Reinforcement Learning2 Aug 2024
- 2023Hierarchical Deep Counterfactual Regret Minimization27 May 2023
- 2022A Unified Approach to Reinforcement Learning, Quantal Response Equilibria, and Two-Player Zero-Sum Games12 Jun 2022
- 2022ESCHER: Eschewing Importance Sampling in Games by Computing a History Value Function to Estimate Regret8 Jun 2022
- 2022Efficient Deviation Types and Learning for Hindsight Rationality in Extensive-Form Games: Corrections24 May 2022
- 2021Efficient Deviation Types and Learning for Hindsight Rationality in Extensive-Form Games13 Feb 2021