Penalizing side effects using stepwise relative reachability
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Abstract (arXiv)
How can we design safe reinforcement learning agents that avoid unnecessary disruptions to their environment? We show that current approaches to penalizing side effects can introduce bad incentives, e.g. to prevent any irreversible changes in the environment, including the actions of other agents. To isolate the source of such undesirable incentives, we break down side effects penalties into two components: a baseline state and a measure of deviation from this baseline state. We argue that some of these incentives arise from the choice of baseline, and others arise from the choice of deviation measure. We introduce a new variant of the stepwise inaction baseline and a new deviation measure based on relative reachability of states. The combination of these design choices avoids the given undesirable incentives, while simpler baselines and the unreachability measure fail. We demonstrate this empirically by comparing different combinations of baseline and deviation measure choices on a set of gridworld experiments designed to illustrate possible bad incentives.
Key facts. Cited by 38 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 4 Jun 2018.
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Citing papers per year: 2018: 1; 2019: 0; 2020: 0; 2021: 6; 2022: 4; 2023: 5; 2024: 9; 2025: 7; 2026: 6.
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- 2021Consequences of Misaligned AIcited by 80
- 2024Open-Endedness is Essential for Artificial Superhuman Intelligencecited by 80
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26 more
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- 2024Partial Identifiability and Misspecification in Inverse Reinforcement Learningcited by 4
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- 2024Dynamic Normativity: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Value Alignmentcited by 3
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- 2021Counterfactual Planning in AGI Systemscited by 2
- 2025AI Agents Should be Regulated Based on the Extent of Their Autonomous Operationscited by 2
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- 2021Be Considerate: Objectives, Side Effects, and Deciding How to Actcited by 1
- 2025NP-Hard Lower Bound Complexity for Semantic Self-Verificationcited by 1
- 2025When Assisting One Disempowers Anothercited by 1
- 2021Challenges for Using Impact Regularizers to Avoid Negative Side Effectscited by 0
- 2021Is the Rush to Machine Learning Jeopardizing Safety? Results of a Surveycited by 0
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- 2026Calibrating Conservatism for Scalable Oversight27 May 2026
- 2026Robust Optimization for Mitigating Reward Hacking with Correlated Proxies13 Apr 2026
- 2026AI Space Physics: Constitutive boundary semantics for open AI institutions3 Mar 2026
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- 2025Cognitive Silicon: An Architectural Blueprint for Post-Industrial Computing Systems23 Apr 2025
- 2025TraCeS: Learning Per-Timestep Constraint-Violation Credit from Sparse Trajectory-Level Labels17 Apr 2025
- 2025AI Agents Should be Regulated Based on the Extent of Their Autonomous Operations7 Feb 2025
- 2025Safety Must Precede the Deployment of Open-Ended AI6 Feb 2025
26 more
- 2025NP-Hard Lower Bound Complexity for Semantic Self-Verification26 Jan 2025
- 2024Partial Identifiability and Misspecification in Inverse Reinforcement Learning24 Nov 2024
- 2024Possible Principles for Aligned Structure Learning Agents30 Sep 2024
- 2024Dynamic Normativity: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Value Alignment16 Jun 2024
- 2024Open-Endedness is Essential for Artificial Superhuman Intelligence6 Jun 2024
- 2024AI Alignment with Changing and Influenceable Reward Functions28 May 2024
- 2024Safe Reinforcement Learning with Learned Non-Markovian Safety Constraints5 May 2024
- 2024Quantifying the Sensitivity of Inverse Reinforcement Learning to Misspecification11 Mar 2024
- 2024Correlated Proxies: A New Definition and Improved Mitigation for Reward Hacking5 Mar 2024
- 2024On the Limitations of Markovian Rewards to Express Multi-Objective, Risk-Sensitive, and Modal Tasks26 Jan 2024
- 2023Risk-averse Batch Active Inverse Reward Design20 Nov 2023
- 2023Environmental-Impact Based Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning6 Nov 2023
- 2023Designing Fiduciary Artificial Intelligence27 Jul 2023
- 2023Safe MDP Planning by Learning Temporal Patterns of Undesirable Trajectories and Averting Negative Side Effects6 Apr 2023
- 2023Low impact agency: review and discussion6 Mar 2023
- 2022When to Ask for Help: Proactive Interventions in Autonomous Reinforcement Learning19 Oct 2022
- 2022Defining and Characterizing Reward Hacking27 Sep 2022
- 2022Formalizing the Problem of Side Effect Regularization23 Jun 2022
- 2022Estimating and Penalizing Induced Preference Shifts in Recommender Systems25 Apr 2022
- 2021Is the Rush to Machine Learning Jeopardizing Safety? Results of a Survey29 Nov 2021
- 2021Be Considerate: Objectives, Side Effects, and Deciding How to Act4 Jun 2021
- 2021Combining Reward Information from Multiple Sources22 Mar 2021
- 2021Consequences of Misaligned AI7 Feb 2021
- 2021Counterfactual Planning in AGI Systems29 Jan 2021
- 2021Challenges for Using Impact Regularizers to Avoid Negative Side Effects29 Jan 2021
- 2018Scalable agent alignment via reward modeling: a research direction19 Nov 2018
- 2018Scalable agent alignment via reward modeling: a research directioncited by 447
- 2022Defining and Characterizing Reward Hackingcited by 203
- 2024Correlated Proxies: A New Definition and Improved Mitigation for Reward Hackingcited by 50
- 2024AI Alignment with Changing and Influenceable Reward Functionscited by 33
- 2025Core Safety Values for Provably Corrigible Agentscited by 5
- 2024Dynamic Normativity: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Value Alignmentcited by 3
- 2026Robust Optimization for Mitigating Reward Hacking with Correlated Proxiescited by 2
- 2026Robust Optimization for Mitigating Reward Hacking with Correlated Proxies13 Apr 2026
- 2025Core Safety Values for Provably Corrigible Agents28 Jul 2025
- 2024Dynamic Normativity: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Value Alignment16 Jun 2024
- 2024AI Alignment with Changing and Influenceable Reward Functions28 May 2024
- 2024Correlated Proxies: A New Definition and Improved Mitigation for Reward Hacking5 Mar 2024
- 2022Defining and Characterizing Reward Hacking27 Sep 2022
- 2018Scalable agent alignment via reward modeling: a research direction19 Nov 2018
- 2024On the Limitations of Markovian Rewards to Express Multi-Objective, Risk-Sensitive, and Modal Taskscited by 9
- 2025Safety Must Precede the Deployment of Open-Ended AIcited by 3
- 2024Safe Reinforcement Learning with Learned Non-Markovian Safety Constraintscited by 0
- 2025TraCeS: Learning Per-Timestep Constraint-Violation Credit from Sparse Trajectory-Level Labelscited by 0
- 2025TraCeS: Learning Per-Timestep Constraint-Violation Credit from Sparse Trajectory-Level Labels17 Apr 2025
- 2025Safety Must Precede the Deployment of Open-Ended AI6 Feb 2025
- 2024Safe Reinforcement Learning with Learned Non-Markovian Safety Constraints5 May 2024
- 2024On the Limitations of Markovian Rewards to Express Multi-Objective, Risk-Sensitive, and Modal Tasks26 Jan 2024
- 2026Ajar: Measuring Open Privilege in Agent Defenses22 Sep 2026
- 2026Calibrating Conservatism for Scalable Oversight27 May 2026
- 2026AI Space Physics: Constitutive boundary semantics for open AI institutions3 Mar 2026
- 2021Consequences of Misaligned AIcited by 80
- 2024Open-Endedness is Essential for Artificial Superhuman Intelligencecited by 80
- 2022Estimating and Penalizing Induced Preference Shifts in Recommender Systemscited by 29
- 2022When to Ask for Help: Proactive Interventions in Autonomous Reinforcement Learningcited by 21
- 2023Designing Fiduciary Artificial Intelligencecited by 8
- 2021Combining Reward Information from Multiple Sourcescited by 7
- 2022Formalizing the Problem of Side Effect Regularizationcited by 3
- 2024Possible Principles for Aligned Structure Learning Agentscited by 3
- 2021Counterfactual Planning in AGI Systemscited by 2
- 2025AI Agents Should be Regulated Based on the Extent of Their Autonomous Operationscited by 2
- 2021Be Considerate: Objectives, Side Effects, and Deciding How to Actcited by 1
- 2025NP-Hard Lower Bound Complexity for Semantic Self-Verificationcited by 1
12 most cited of 22 All 22 (JSON)
- 2026HarvestBench: Measuring Whether LLM Agents Will Pay to Avoid Killing Animals3 Sep 2026
- 2026Individual Disempowerment through an Advice Channel: Control Loss when Influence is Endogenous14 Aug 2026
- 2025When Assisting One Disempowers Another6 Nov 2025
- 2025Cognitive Silicon: An Architectural Blueprint for Post-Industrial Computing Systems23 Apr 2025
- 2025AI Agents Should be Regulated Based on the Extent of Their Autonomous Operations7 Feb 2025
- 2025NP-Hard Lower Bound Complexity for Semantic Self-Verification26 Jan 2025
- 2024Possible Principles for Aligned Structure Learning Agents30 Sep 2024
- 2024Open-Endedness is Essential for Artificial Superhuman Intelligence6 Jun 2024
- 2023Risk-averse Batch Active Inverse Reward Design20 Nov 2023
- 2023Environmental-Impact Based Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning6 Nov 2023
- 2023Designing Fiduciary Artificial Intelligence27 Jul 2023
- 2023Safe MDP Planning by Learning Temporal Patterns of Undesirable Trajectories and Averting Negative Side Effects6 Apr 2023
12 newest of 22 All 22 (JSON)