On the Computation of Fully Proportional Representation
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Abstract (arXiv)
We investigate two systems of fully proportional representation suggested by Chamberlin Courant and Monroe. Both systems assign a representative to each voter so that the "sum of misrepresentations" is minimized. The winner determination problem for both systems is known to be NP-hard, hence this work aims at investigating whether there are variants of the proposed rules and/or specific electorates for which these problems can be solved efficiently. As a variation of these rules, instead of minimizing the sum of misrepresentations, we considered minimizing the maximal misrepresentation introducing effectively two new rules. In the general case these "minimax" versions of classical rules appeared to be still NP-hard. We investigated the parameterized complexity of winner determination of the two classical and two new rules with respect to several parameters. Here we have a mixture of positive and negative results: e.g., we proved fixed-parameter tractability for the parameter the number of candidates but fixed-parameter intractability for the number of winners. For single-peaked electorates our results are overwhelmingly positive: we provide polynomial-time algorithms for most of the considered problems. The only rule that remains NP-hard for single-peaked electorates is the classical Monroe rule.
Key facts. Cited by 14 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 4 Feb 2014.
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Citing papers per year: 2021: 4; 2022: 2; 2023: 2; 2024: 1; 2025: 3; 2026: 2.
14 papers.
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- 2023Generative Social Choicecited by 43
- 2023Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Votingcited by 14
- 2025Drawing a Map of Electionscited by 4
- 2021DiRe Committee : Diversity and Representation Constraints in Multiwinner Electionscited by 3
- 2024Multi-Group Proportional Representation in Retrievalcited by 2
- 2025Diversity of Structured Domains via k-Kemeny Scorescited by 2
- 2026Polynomial-Time Algorithm for Thiele Voting Rules with Voter Interval Preferencescited by 2
- 2021Bribery as a Measure of Candidate Success: Complexity Results for Approval-Based Multiwinner Rulescited by 1
- 2021The Complexity of Learning Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting Rulescited by 1
- 2022Parameterized Intractability for Multi-Winner Election under the Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the Monroe Rulecited by 1
- 2022Indivisible Participatory Budgeting under Weak Rankingscited by 1
- 2021Fine-Grained Complexity and Algorithms for the Schulze Voting Methodcited by 0
2 more
- 2026Algorithms for Structured Elections under Thiele Voting Rules30 Jul 2026
- 2026Polynomial-Time Algorithm for Thiele Voting Rules with Voter Interval Preferences7 Apr 2026
- 2025Diversity of Structured Domains via k-Kemeny Scores19 Sep 2025
- 2025Efficient Algorithms for Electing Successive Committees23 May 2025
- 2025Drawing a Map of Elections4 Apr 2025
- 2024Multi-Group Proportional Representation in Retrieval11 Jul 2024
- 2023Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Voting7 Dec 2023
- 2023Generative Social Choice3 Sep 2023
- 2022Indivisible Participatory Budgeting under Weak Rankings16 Jul 2022
- 2022Parameterized Intractability for Multi-Winner Election under the Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the Monroe Rule24 Feb 2022
- 2021The Complexity of Learning Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting Rules1 Oct 2021
- 2021DiRe Committee : Diversity and Representation Constraints in Multiwinner Elections15 Jul 2021
- 2023Generative Social Choicecited by 43
- 2023Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Votingcited by 14
- 2025Drawing a Map of Electionscited by 4
- 2021DiRe Committee : Diversity and Representation Constraints in Multiwinner Electionscited by 3
- 2024Multi-Group Proportional Representation in Retrievalcited by 2
- 2025Diversity of Structured Domains via k-Kemeny Scorescited by 2
- 2026Polynomial-Time Algorithm for Thiele Voting Rules with Voter Interval Preferencescited by 2
- 2021Bribery as a Measure of Candidate Success: Complexity Results for Approval-Based Multiwinner Rulescited by 1
- 2021The Complexity of Learning Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting Rulescited by 1
- 2022Parameterized Intractability for Multi-Winner Election under the Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the Monroe Rulecited by 1
- 2022Indivisible Participatory Budgeting under Weak Rankingscited by 1
- 2021Fine-Grained Complexity and Algorithms for the Schulze Voting Methodcited by 0
12 most cited of 14 All 14 (JSON)
- 2026Algorithms for Structured Elections under Thiele Voting Rules30 Jul 2026
- 2026Polynomial-Time Algorithm for Thiele Voting Rules with Voter Interval Preferences7 Apr 2026
- 2025Diversity of Structured Domains via k-Kemeny Scores19 Sep 2025
- 2025Efficient Algorithms for Electing Successive Committees23 May 2025
- 2025Drawing a Map of Elections4 Apr 2025
- 2024Multi-Group Proportional Representation in Retrieval11 Jul 2024
- 2023Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Voting7 Dec 2023
- 2023Generative Social Choice3 Sep 2023
- 2022Indivisible Participatory Budgeting under Weak Rankings16 Jul 2022
- 2022Parameterized Intractability for Multi-Winner Election under the Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the Monroe Rule24 Feb 2022
- 2021The Complexity of Learning Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting Rules1 Oct 2021
- 2021DiRe Committee : Diversity and Representation Constraints in Multiwinner Elections15 Jul 2021
12 newest of 14 All 14 (JSON)