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Efficient Algorithms for Electing Successive Committees

arXiv 2505.18287 ↗First posted 23 May 2025cs.GT cs.AIcited by 0

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Abstract (arXiv)

In a recently introduced model of successive committee elections (Bredereck et al., AAAI-20) for a given set of ordinal or approval preferences one aims to find a sequence of a given length of "best" same-size committees such that each candidate is a member of a limited number of consecutive committees. However, the practical usability of this model remains limited, as the described task turns out to be NP-hard for most selection criteria already for seeking committees of size three. Non-trivial or somewhat efficient algorithms for these cases are lacking too. Motivated by a desire to unlock the full potential of the described temporal model of committee elections, we devise (parameterized) algorithms that effectively solve the mentioned hard cases in realistic scenarios of a moderate number of candidates or of a limited time horizon.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 9 of its 32 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 23 May 2025.

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9 of 32 references.

References · 9

  1. 2020Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferencescited by 37
  2. 2023Proportional Aggregation of Preferences for Sequential Decision Makingcited by 17
  3. 2014On the Computation of Fully Proportional Representationcited by 14
  4. 2023Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Votingcited by 14
  5. 2020When Votes Change and Committees Should (Not)cited by 7
  6. 2024Guide to Numerical Experiments on Elections in Computational Social Choicecited by 7
  7. 2021Parameterized Algorithms for Diverse Multistage Problemscited by 2
  8. 2021Perpetual Voting: The Axiomatic Lenscited by 1
  9. 2022Parameterized Intractability for Multi-Winner Election under the Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the Monroe Rulecited by 1

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