Efficient Algorithms for Electing Successive Committees
Not on the map. Why?
Abstract (arXiv)
In a recently introduced model of successive committee elections (Bredereck et al., AAAI-20) for a given set of ordinal or approval preferences one aims to find a sequence of a given length of "best" same-size committees such that each candidate is a member of a limited number of consecutive committees. However, the practical usability of this model remains limited, as the described task turns out to be NP-hard for most selection criteria already for seeking committees of size three. Non-trivial or somewhat efficient algorithms for these cases are lacking too. Motivated by a desire to unlock the full potential of the described temporal model of committee elections, we devise (parameterized) algorithms that effectively solve the mentioned hard cases in realistic scenarios of a moderate number of candidates or of a limited time horizon.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 9 of its 32 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 23 May 2025.
Builds on
9 of 32 references.
References · 9
- 2020Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferencescited by 37
- 2023Proportional Aggregation of Preferences for Sequential Decision Makingcited by 17
- 2014On the Computation of Fully Proportional Representationcited by 14
- 2023Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Votingcited by 14
- 2020When Votes Change and Committees Should (Not)cited by 7
- 2024Guide to Numerical Experiments on Elections in Computational Social Choicecited by 7
- 2021Parameterized Algorithms for Diverse Multistage Problemscited by 2
- 2021Perpetual Voting: The Axiomatic Lenscited by 1
- 2022Parameterized Intractability for Multi-Winner Election under the Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the Monroe Rulecited by 1
Built on by
Not cited yet.