mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Cost-Efficient Privacy Enforcement for Email-Generating LLM Agents under Strategic Information Requests

arXiv 2610.18007 ↗First posted 13 Oct 2026cs.CR cs.AIcited by 0

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

LLM agents now act as delegated communication intermediaries: they read private context, draft messages, and send externally visible emails on behalf of a user. Existing checker-repair defenses can reduce inappropriate disclosure, but they rely on repeated calls to a remote action LLM (the model that drafts and repairs the email) and a remote checker LLM whenever a draft fails validation. This creates a cost problem as well as a privacy problem, especially when a requester strategically asks for exact values, raw records, source evidence, or other details that induce leakage-heavy drafts. We propose local contract-conditioned rewriting as a cost-efficient enforcement layer for email-generating agents. The mechanism intercepts an outgoing draft, constructs an information-release contract that specifies what to preserve, generalize, and forbid, rewrites the draft with a local Gemma rewriter, and selectively invokes a final PrivacyChecker. Across extensive email tasks under normal prompts and attack prompts that operationalize strategic information requests, Gemma + Checker reduces normal-prompt leakage from 11.41% to 4.03% while improving UsableRate (satisfied or partially satisfied outputs) from 85.2% to 92.6%. Under the strategic attack-prompt condition, it reduces leakage from 28.19% to 18.79% and reduces checker-only cost amplification from 1.32x to 1.02x. Offline replay ablation shows that the full contract reduces leakage relative to generic Gemma rewriting by 36.3% under normal prompts and 54.1% under attack prompts. These results support a local-first privacy enforcement design: move repair to a cheaper trusted local layer when possible, but retain the checker as the final semantic gate for high-risk sends.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 12 of its 19 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 13 Oct 2026.

Builds on

12 of 19 references.

Closest ancestors · 5

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025Privacy in Action: Towards Realistic Privacy Mitigation and Evaluation for LLM-Powered Agents22 Sep
  2. 2025AgentDAM: Privacy Leakage Evaluation for Autonomous Web Agents12 Mar
  3. 2025Adaptive Attacks Break Defenses Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on LLM Agents27 Feb
  4. 2024AirGapAgent: Protecting Privacy-Conscious Conversational Agents8 May
  5. 2024InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents5 Mar

Other references · 7

  1. 2022ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Modelscited by 8,695
  2. 2023Toolformer: Language Models Can Teach Themselves to Use Toolscited by 4,182
  3. 2024The Instruction Hierarchy: Training LLMs to Prioritize Privileged Instructionscited by 493
  4. 2023Can LLMs Keep a Secret? Testing Privacy Implications of Language Models via Contextual Integrity Theorycited by 230
  5. 2024PrivacyLens: Evaluating Privacy Norm Awareness of Language Models in Actioncited by 171
  6. 2024Safeguarding Large Language Models: A Surveycited by 78
  7. 2024CI-Bench: Benchmarking Contextual Integrity of AI Assistants on Synthetic Datacited by 37

Built on by

Not cited yet.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026Agents That Know Too Much: A Data-Centric Survey of Privacy in LLM Agents
  2. 2026AgentLeak: A Benchmark for Internal-Channel Privacy Leakage in Multi-Agent LLM Systems
  3. 2026TraceGrant: A Contract-Governed Security Framework for the Task-Effect Lifecycle of Networked LLM Agents
  4. 2026AgentCIScope: Grounded Contextual Integrity Evaluation for LLM Agents
  5. 2026LLM-Redactor: An Empirical Evaluation of Eight Techniques for Privacy-Preserving LLM Requests
  6. 2026PrivacyPeek: Auditing What LLM-Based Agents Acquire, Not Just What They Say
  7. 2026OCELOT: Inference-Leakage Budgets for Privacy-Preserving LLM Agents
  8. 2026Confuse the Model, Control the Flow: Understanding and Mitigating Privacy Leakage from LLM Agents with Information Flow Control