Memetic Trojans: Social Contagions as Carriers of Adversarial Payloads in Agent Networks
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
Autonomous large language model (LLM) agents increasingly interact in network environments where adversarial content can propagate between agents. Known attacks include agent worms, which spread through self-replicating prompt injections or configuration compromises. We introduce memetic trojans, a distinct class of network-mediated attack that exploits agents' tendencies to retransmit and amplify content. Unlike agent worms, whose propagation is adversarially induced, memetic trojans exploit endogenous transmission by embedding adversarial payloads in social contagions: content agents have internal reasons to share. As part of our work, we extract social contagions from Moltbook, a social media platform for LLM agents. Controlled transmission experiments reveal large differences in virality: the most effective contagion is retransmitted in approximately 50% of subsequent agent posts and upvoted at 2.5x the average post's rate. Its memetic trojan counterpart largely inherits these properties. Monte Carlo attack simulations show that memetic trojans amplify expected exposure by up to 3.19x. Network structure and amplification mechanisms strongly shape propagation, producing heavy-tailed outcomes with near network-wide exposure. These results identify endogenous social transmission as a distinct security vulnerability in multi-agent systems. Because propagation does not require agents to follow malicious retransmission instructions, defenses focused on prompt-injection detection or preventing agent compromise cannot alone prevent memetic trojan propagation. Securing large-scale agent ecosystems may require network-level defenses that account for how agent preferences, recommendation mechanisms, and network topology amplify adversarial payloads.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 22 of its 45 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 30 Sep 2026.
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22 of 45 references.
Closest ancestors · 8
Same direction, newest first
- 2026Mind Viruses: Self-Propagating Ideas in Multi-Agent LLM Systems10 Aug
- 2026Autonomous LLM Agent Worms: Cross-Platform Propagation, Automated Discovery and Temporal Re-Entry Defense4 May
- 2026Towards Secure Agent Skills: Architecture, Threat Taxonomy, and Security Analysis3 Apr
- 2026AgentWorm: Self-Propagating Attacks Across LLM Agent Ecosystems16 Mar
- 2025Progent: Securing AI Agents with Privilege Control16 Apr
- 2025Defeating Prompt Injections by Design24 Mar
- 2024Agent Security Bench (ASB): Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in LLM-based Agents3 Oct
- 2024IsolateGPT: An Execution Isolation Architecture for LLM-Based Agentic Systems8 Mar
Other references · 14
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- 2025gpt-oss-120b & gpt-oss-20b Model Cardcited by 1,258
- 2026DeepSeek-V4: Towards Highly Efficient Million-Token Context Intelligencecited by 877
- 2019Quantifying the Carbon Emissions of Machine Learningcited by 516
- 2025Securing AI Agents with Information-Flow Controlcited by 108
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- 2024Here Comes The AI Worm: Unleashing Zero-click Worms that Target GenAI-Powered Applicationscited by 58
- 2020Uncovering Coordinated Networks on Social Media: Methods and Case Studiescited by 49
- 2014Can Cascades be Predicted?cited by 31
- 2026Does Socialization Emerge in AI Agent Society? A Case Study of Moltbookcited by 13
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