mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Selective Channel Restoration for Backdoored Vision-Language Models

arXiv 2609.37759 ↗First posted 29 Sep 2026cs.CR cs.CVcited by 0

On the map: Multimodal LLMs / vision-language models → MLLM jailbreaks and adversarial robustness

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Abstract (arXiv)

Vision-language models (VLMs) exhibit strong multimodal capabilities but remain vulnerable to backdoors implanted through poisoned fine-tuning data. Existing defenses often require extensive parameter updates during fine-tuning or incur per-query overhead during inference. To address these limitations, we propose Perturb-Select-Restore (PSR), a post-training defense that performs sparse updates to the projection interface and introduces no additional computation during inference. We reveal that backdoored VLM projectors are substantially more sensitive to bounded perturbations than clean VLM projectors, a phenomenon we term projection fragility. Building on this finding, PSR identifies the output channels most sensitive to perturbations in each projection layer of a backdoored VLM and restores their parameters to the corresponding pretrained values. Experiments across multiple tasks show that PSR reduces attack success rates to near zero while preserving clean-task performance.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in MLLM jailbreaks and adversarial robustness, one of 16 directions in Multimodal LLMs / vision-language models. Builds on 23 of its 28 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 29 Sep 2026.

Builds on

23 of 28 references.

Closest ancestors · 7

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026Test-Time Attention Purification for Backdoored Large Vision Language Models13 Mar
  2. 2025SRD: Reinforcement-Learned Semantic Perturbation for Backdoor Defense in VLMs5 Jun
  3. 2025Robust Anti-Backdoor Instruction Tuning in LVLMs4 Jun
  4. 2025Backdoor Cleaning without External Guidance in MLLM Fine-tuning22 May
  5. 2024Backdooring Vision-Language Models with Out-Of-Distribution Data2 Oct
  6. 2024TrojVLM: Backdoor Attack Against Vision Language Models28 Sep
  7. 2024Revisiting Backdoor Attacks against Large Vision-Language Models from Domain Shift27 Jun

Other references · 16

  1. 2014Microsoft COCO: Common Objects in Contextcited by 17,608
  2. 2023Improved Baselines with Visual Instruction Tuningcited by 4,418
  3. 2023InstructBLIP: Towards General-purpose Vision-Language Models with Instruction Tuningcited by 2,876
  4. 2025Qwen3-VL Technical Reportcited by 2,793
  5. 2023MiniGPT-4: Enhancing Vision-Language Understanding with Advanced Large Language Modelscited by 2,711
  6. 2016Making the V in VQA Matter: Elevating the Role of Image Understanding in Visual Question Answeringcited by 2,516
  7. 2014CIDEr: Consensus-based Image Description Evaluationcited by 2,046
  8. 2015Microsoft COCO Captions: Data Collection and Evaluation Servercited by 1,462
  9. 2017Targeted Backdoor Attacks on Deep Learning Systems Using Data Poisoningcited by 1,055
  10. 2018Fine-Pruning: Defending Against Backdooring Attacks on Deep Neural Networkscited by 580
  11. 2018Spectral Signatures in Backdoor Attackscited by 484
  12. 2020Invisible Backdoor Attack with Sample-Specific Triggerscited by 353
4 more
  1. 2021Adversarial Neuron Pruning Purifies Backdoored Deep Modelscited by 235
  2. 2022Data-free Backdoor Removal based on Channel Lipschitznesscited by 79
  3. 2023Reconstructive Neuron Pruning for Backdoor Defensecited by 59
  4. 2024Unveiling and Mitigating Backdoor Vulnerabilities based on Unlearning Weight Changes and Backdoor Activenesscited by 6

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  1. 2025BackdoorVLM: A Benchmark for Backdoor Attacks and Defenses on Vision-Language Models
  2. 2026Phantasia: Context-Adaptive Backdoors in Vision Language Models
  3. 2026Purifying Backdoored Large Vision-Language Models by Removing Hijacked Directions
  4. 2026Inject Once Survive Later: Backdooring Vision-Language-Action Models to Persist Through Downstream Fine-tuning
  5. 2026It Takes Little to Rewrite Perception: Targeted Semantic Substitution in Vision-Language Models at ε≤ 4/255
  6. 2025Safeguarding Vision-Language Models: Mitigating Vulnerabilities to Gaussian Noise in Perturbation-based Attacks
  7. 2026A Patch-based Cross-view Regularized Framework for Backdoor Defense in Multimodal Large Language Models
  8. 2026Grounding-Driven Attack: Improving Encoder-based Adversarial Transferability against Large Vision-Language Models