mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

HESP: Separating What to Probe from When to Stop in Local LLM Alert-Triage Agents

arXiv 2609.33446 ↗First posted 27 Sep 2026cs.CR cs.AIcited by 0

New in LLM agents and tool use; no direction yet. LLM agents and tool use

Abstract (arXiv)

Security operations centers receive far more alerts than analysts can investigate, and organizations that cannot send their telemetry to hosted models must automate triage with small open-weight LLMs on their own hardware. Current LLM agents leave the investigation procedure to the model, and small local models fail at it: they probe without converging, never commit to a verdict, or dismiss real attacks. In this paper, we present HESP, a controller that holds the investigation procedure outside the model. HESP keeps a ledger of competing explanations, selects read-only probes by expected information gain per cost, accepts only verdicts backed by current evidence, can end an investigation itself, and journals every prediction before its observation. We evaluated HESP in four pre-registered studies with five open-weight models from two families (7B to 72B), totalling 7,272 audited episodes in a controlled triage environment. With likelihood tables counted from LLM-free runs, HESP lifts Qwen2.5-7B from 0.125 to 1.000 verified completion, matching oracle tables. The information-gain ranking adds +0.26 to +0.35 on every model that concludes, and a controller-side stop lifts Llama-3.1-8B, which never concludes on its own, from 0 to 0.917. What to probe and when to stop are therefore separate failures, and different small models exhibit different ones. Because HESP and its planner run entirely on local hardware, it suits environments where telemetry cannot leave the premises. We release all code, protocols, and episode journals at https://github.com/lzwhehe/HESP.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 11 of its 44 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 27 Sep 2026.

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References · 11

  1. 2022ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Modelscited by 8,695
  2. 2023Reflexion: Language Agents with Verbal Reinforcement Learningcited by 4,276
  3. 2023Toolformer: Language Models Can Teach Themselves to Use Toolscited by 4,182
  4. 2022Language Models (Mostly) Know What They Knowcited by 1,856
  5. 2024Cybench: A Framework for Evaluating Cybersecurity Capabilities and Risks of Language Modelscited by 164
  6. 2025Progent: Securing AI Agents with Privilege Controlcited by 141
  7. 2024IsolateGPT: An Execution Isolation Architecture for LLM-Based Agentic Systemscited by 130
  8. 2020Dos and Don'ts of Machine Learning in Computer Securitycited by 102
  9. 2023Kairos: Practical Intrusion Detection and Investigation using Whole-system Provenancecited by 31
  10. 2025ExCyTIn-Bench: Evaluating LLM agents on Cyber Threat Investigationcited by 15
  11. 2024AI-Driven Guided Response for Security Operation Centers with Microsoft Copilot for Securitycited by 7

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  3. 2026Towards Agentic Investigation of Security Alerts
  4. 2026Explainable AML Triage with LLMs: Evidence Retrieval and Counterfactual Checks
  5. 2026Don't Start What You Can't Finish: A Counterfactual Audit of Support-State Triage in LLM Agents
  6. 2026The Model Proposes, the Code Disposes: A Pre-Registered Ablation of a Verifier-and-Acceptance Stage in an LLM-Orchestrated Offensive-Security Agent
  7. 2026Online Safety Monitoring for LLMs
  8. 2026Real-Time Detection and Repair of LLM Agent Failures