CART: Closed-Loop Adaptive Red Teaming for Large Language Models
On the map: LLM safety and security → Prompt injection and agent security
Abstract (arXiv)
Automated red teaming often replays a fixed set of prompts, which measures known risks but cannot learn from failures found during testing. We present CART (Closed-Loop Adaptive Red Teaming), a framework that uses each result to guide what it tests next. CART begins with broad risk coverage, follows weaknesses that emerge, keeps new probes diverse, and records the evidence and source of every finding. It separates the Challenger that creates tests, the Target being tested, which may be a text-only model or a bounded tool-using agent, and the Judge that evaluates the results, allowing these roles to be studied independently. Across three evaluation families (Frontier, JAH, and Agentic), CART discovers more failures and higher average risk than static seed replay for every Target with an available baseline. The gains extend to tool-mediated agent tests, suggesting that contextual adaptation can reveal weaknesses that direct prompt replay does not exercise. These results describe what the test policies discover, not how often failures occur in real deployments. We also find that Challenger-Judge choices affect the evidence uncovered, highlighting the need for role separation and independent review. Overall, CART turns red teaming from a one-time checklist into a continuous, adaptive, and auditable search for model and agent weaknesses.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Prompt injection and agent security, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 25 of its 44 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 23 Sep 2026.
Builds on
25 of 44 references.
Closest ancestors · 10
Same direction, newest first
- 2026Learning to Attack and Defend: Adaptive Red Teaming of Language Models via GRPO8 Jun
- 2025Lessons From Red Teaming 100 Generative AI Products13 Jan
- 2024AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents11 Oct
- 2024Agent Security Bench (ASB): Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in LLM-based Agents3 Oct
- 2024InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents5 Mar
- 2024HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusal6 Feb
- 2023Benchmarking and Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on Large Language Models21 Dec
- 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection23 Feb
- 2022Red Teaming Language Models to Reduce Harms: Methods, Scaling Behaviors, and Lessons Learned23 Aug
- 2022Red Teaming Language Models with Language Models7 Feb
Other references · 15
- 2023Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arenacited by 8,626
- 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Modelscited by 3,104
- 2023G-Eval: NLG Evaluation using GPT-4 with Better Human Alignmentcited by 2,276
- 2023Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queriescited by 1,420
- 2022Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Modelscited by 832
- 2023AutoDAN: Generating Stealthy Jailbreak Prompts on Aligned Large Language Modelscited by 785
- 2019Universal Adversarial Triggers for Attacking and Analyzing NLPcited by 722
- 2023Tree of Attacks: Jailbreaking Black-Box LLMs Automaticallycited by 672
- 2023GPTFUZZER: Red Teaming Large Language Models with Auto-Generated Jailbreak Promptscited by 560
- 2023Identifying the Risks of LM Agents with an LM-Emulated Sandboxcited by 548
- 2017A Tutorial on Thompson Samplingcited by 433
- 2024A StrongREJECT for Empty Jailbreakscited by 385
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- 2024Automated Red Teaming with GOAT: the Generative Offensive Agent Tester