PAPC: Platform Mediation for Privacy-Propagation Externalities in AI-Mediated Workflows
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
AI-mediated platforms coordinate work through LLM agents acting for different principals. In these workflows, privacy loss can be created before a final answer appears: a memory write, shared-workspace update, inter-agent message, or tool event may impose downstream exposure cost on another principal. We model this failure mode as a privacy-propagation externality, where the cost of a raw disclosure depends on topology and fanout as well as content. We present PAPC, a platform-mediated mechanism that intercepts information-moving events before they update shared state or external channels. PAPC combines policy, provenance, topology/fanout, privilege, and content signals to allow an event, release a policy-safe abstraction, quarantine raw content, block a transition, or narrow onward rights. The model explains why final-output control misses intermediate exposure costs and why high-fanout objects amplify propagation. Across retrieval-memory and multi-agent workflow benchmarks, PAPC preserves deterministic task completion and eliminates measured exact raw-value and external raw-value exposure. The results position event-level mediation as a platform-governance primitive for agent-mediated online work.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 11 of its 27 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 16 Sep 2026.
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11 of 27 references.
Closest ancestors · 6
Same direction, newest first
- 2025AgentDAM: Privacy Leakage Evaluation for Autonomous Web Agents12 Mar
- 2025Unveiling Privacy Risks in LLM Agent Memory17 Feb
- 2025G-Safeguard: A Topology-Guided Security Lens and Treatment on LLM-based Multi-agent Systems16 Feb
- 2024Agent Security Bench (ASB): Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in LLM-based Agents3 Oct
- 2024AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Bases17 Jul
- 2024Agent Smith: A Single Image Can Jailbreak One Million Multimodal LLM Agents Exponentially Fast13 Feb
Other references · 5
- 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,443
- 2025A-MEM: Agentic Memory for LLM Agentscited by 1,063
- 2023Formalizing and Benchmarking Prompt Injection Attacks and Defensescited by 364
- 2020Performative Predictioncited by 327
- 2015Strategic Classificationcited by 257
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- 2026From Privacy to Workflow Integrity: Communication-Graph Metadata in Autonomous Agent Interoperability
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- 2026PAAC: Privacy-Aware Agentic Device-Cloud Collaboration
- 2026Authenticated Workflows: A Systems Approach to Protecting Agentic AI
- 2026AgentLeak: A Benchmark for Internal-Channel Privacy Leakage in Multi-Agent LLM Systems
- 2026When the Agent Becomes the Kernel: A Systematization of Security on the Path to AI-Native Operating Systems
- 2026CI-Work: Benchmarking Contextual Integrity in Enterprise LLM Agents
- 2026AgentPrivArena: Evaluating and Auditing Real-world AI Agent Privacy