Norms at a Price: Why RL-Based Alignment Can Promise Conditional Compliance at Best
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Abstract (arXiv)
AI agents sometimes act aligned when they infer they are being tested, and differently when not. We argue this is not an anomaly but what current training regimes are structured to select for. Reinforcement-learning-based alignment folds norms and task pursuit into one policy: the system learns its norms from scored behavior, and scoring flattens them. Do not do X is learned as doing X costs something if noticed. On every datum training can produce, a policy that complies only when it might be observed is indistinguishable from one that complies always. The experiment that would tell them apart - scoring unobserved behavior - is a contradiction in terms. Conditional compliance is thus the most that behavioral training can be known to deliver. Agency sharpens the problem: agents operate mostly where no one is watching, and can act on whether they are watched. An iterated pipeline that trains against detected failures selects for passing detection, not for complying. This account unifies alignment faking, sandbagging, and evaluation-aware scheming. And it reorients the remedy: not deeper internalization but architecture, making violations unavailable rather than unchosen.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 26 of its 41 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 7 Sep 2026.
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References · 26
- 2022Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedbackcited by 3,050
- 2023Open Problems and Fundamental Limitations of Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedbackcited by 759
- 2024Sleeper Agents: Training Deceptive LLMs that Persist Through Safety Trainingcited by 529
- 2017Safe Reinforcement Learning via Shieldingcited by 449
- 2025Monitoring Reasoning Models for Misbehavior and the Risks of Promoting Obfuscationcited by 384
- 2024Alignment faking in large language modelscited by 360
- 2024Deliberative Alignment: Reasoning Enables Safer Language Modelscited by 308
- 2024Frontier Models are Capable of In-context Schemingcited by 287
- 2019Risks from Learned Optimization in Advanced Machine Learning Systemscited by 258
- 2025Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AIcited by 163
- 2024AI Sandbagging: Language Models can Strategically Underperform on Evaluationscited by 145
- 2023Taken out of context: On measuring situational awareness in LLMscited by 143
14 more
- 2022Goal Misgeneralization: Why Correct Specifications Aren't Enough For Correct Goalscited by 126
- 2021Goal Misgeneralization in Deep Reinforcement Learningcited by 123
- 2023Scheming AIs: Will AIs fake alignment during training in order to get power?cited by 97
- 2024Towards Guaranteed Safe AI: A Framework for Ensuring Robust and Reliable AI Systemscited by 96
- 2025Stress Testing Deliberative Alignment for Anti-Scheming Trainingcited by 86
- 2024Me, Myself, and AI: The Situational Awareness Dataset (SAD) for LLMscited by 84
- 2024Beyond Preferences in AI Alignmentcited by 49
- 2025Probing and Steering Evaluation Awareness of Language Modelscited by 35
- 2025Characterizing AI Agents for Alignment and Governancecited by 30
- 2025The Hawthorne Effect in Reasoning Models: Evaluating and Steering Test Awarenesscited by 30
- 2024On the Quest for Effectiveness in Human Oversight: Interdisciplinary Perspectivescited by 28
- 2026Breaking Up with Normatively Monolithic Agency with GRACE: A Reason-Based Neuro-Symbolic Architecture for Safe and Ethical AI Alignmentcited by 5
- 2026Value-Conflict Diagnostics Reveal Widespread Alignment Faking in Language Modelscited by 3
- 2026Measuring Reward-Seeking via Contrastive Belief Updatescited by 3
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