HiRoute: Hierarchical Routed Prompt Tuning for Safety Alignment of Large Language Models
On the map: LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation → Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks
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Abstract (arXiv)
Large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to harmful requests and jailbreak attacks. Parameter-efficient safety alignment methods based on prompt tuning typically rely on a single global prompt or externally selected prompt modules. Such static designs struggle to maintain a cross-category safety boundary while generating constructive responses tailored to specific risks and avoiding over-refusal of benign inputs. To address these limitations, we propose HiRoute, an input-adaptive hierarchical prompt-tuning framework that separates category-agnostic safety control from category-specific response guidance. HiRoute first trains a lightweight hierarchical router on representations extracted from a frozen LLM to jointly detect harmful intent and predict multi-label risk scores. It then freezes both the backbone model and the router and uses preference optimization with alternating gradient updates to learn a shared coarse-grained prompt and a set of fine-grained prompt experts as continuous embeddings. At inference time, benign inputs bypass the safety branch, whereas risky inputs are processed using the shared prompt together with a router-weighted mixture of risk-specific prompt experts. Experiments across three instruction-tuned models show that HiRoute achieves high safety rates across multiple safety benchmarks while preserving safe-response helpfulness, reducing over-refusal, and maintaining competitive performance on general-purpose tasks.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks, one of 10 directions in LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation. Builds on 13 of its 20 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 13 Aug 2026.
Builds on
13 of 20 references.
Closest ancestors · 4
Same direction, newest first
- 2026MOSAIC: Composable Safety Alignment with Modular Control Tokens17 Mar
- 2025Oyster-I: Beyond Refusal -- Constructive Safety Alignment for Responsible Language Models2 Sep
- 2024Safety Alignment of Large Language Models via Contrasting Safe and Harmful Distributions24 Jun
- 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models27 Jul
Other references · 9
- 2022Training language models to follow instructions with human feedbackcited by 15,712
- 2021Training Verifiers to Solve Math Word Problemscited by 9,743
- 2023Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arenacited by 8,393
- 2023Direct Preference Optimization: Your Language Model is Secretly a Reward Modelcited by 7,916
- 2021The Power of Scale for Parameter-Efficient Prompt Tuningcited by 3,769
- 2021Finetuned Language Models Are Zero-Shot Learnerscited by 3,747
- 2022Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedbackcited by 2,950
- 2023Safety-Tuned LLaMAs: Lessons From Improving the Safety of Large Language Models that Follow Instructionscited by 377
- 2025Efficiency vs. Alignment: Investigating Safety and Fairness Risks in Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning of LLMscited by 4
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Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2025SafeMERGE: Preserving Safety Alignment in Fine-Tuned Large Language Models via Selective Layer-Wise Model Merging
- 2025Safety Alignment Should Be Made More Than Just A Few Attention Heads
- 2026ReFrame: Evidence-Guided Test-Time Safety Alignment in Multimodal Large Language Models
- 2026SafeSteer: Localized On-Policy Distillation for Efficient Safety Alignment
- 2025SABER: Uncovering Vulnerabilities in Safety Alignment via Cross-Layer Residual Connection
- 2026Understanding and Preserving Safety in Fine-Tuned LLMs
- 2026HyperSafe: Inference-Time Safety Recovery for Fine-Tuned Language Models
- 2025STAIR: Improving Safety Alignment with Introspective Reasoning