mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

ElasticBack: Stealthy Conditional Backdoor in LLM-Agent Skills via Coupled Trigger-Rule Optimization

arXiv 2608.09577 ↗First posted 10 Aug 2026cs.AIcited by 0

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

also in 1 more
Abstract (arXiv)

Agent skills, bundles of instructions and resources that an LLM agent loads on demand, form an emerging supply chain where a single poisoned skill can persistently compromise every agent that installs it. However, existing skill attacks either fire on every request or rely on fine-tuned weights or multiple skills, leaving a conditional and low-cost backdoor unexplored. In this work, we present ElasticBack, an effective conditional single-skill backdoor that plants a rule R in the skill document and a benign-looking trigger T in the user query, so the malicious payload fires only when both co-occur. ElasticBack binds the two sides through a trigger-as-switch construction, generating R via semantic-anchored rule injection. It then freezes R and evolves T against it with a stealth-constrained genetic search, so that effectiveness and stealth are optimized, keeping the backdoor weight-free and dormant on benign inputs. Extensive experiments across three target behaviors (50 skills each) and four agent LLMs show that ElasticBack attains a high attack success rate at a near-zero false-positive rate with preserved clean accuracy, transfers across models, and evades deployment-time defenses. These results motivate stronger defenses for the skill supply chain.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 21 of its 38 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 10 Aug 2026.

Builds on

21 of 38 references.

Closest ancestors · 8

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026Agent Skill Security: Threat Models, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation15 Jul
  2. 2026Seeing Is Not Screening: Multimodal Hidden Instruction Attacks on Agent Skill Scanners16 Jun
  3. 2026Supply-Chain Poisoning Attacks Against LLM Coding Agent Skill Ecosystems3 Apr
  4. 2026Agent Skills in the Wild: An Empirical Study of Security Vulnerabilities at Scale15 Jan
  5. 2025AgentAuditor: Human-Level Safety and Security Evaluation for LLM Agents31 May
  6. 2025Prompt Injection Attack to Tool Selection in LLM Agents28 Apr
  7. 2025Safety at Scale: A Comprehensive Survey of Large Model and Agent Safety2 Feb
  8. 2024AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Bases17 Jul

Other references · 13

  1. 2019Sentence-BERT: Sentence Embeddings using Siamese BERT-Networkscited by 9,049
  2. 2023Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arenacited by 8,393
  3. 2026SkillsBench: Benchmarking How Well Agent Skills Work Across Diverse Taskscited by 289
  4. 2024Data Interpreter: An LLM Agent For Data Sciencecited by 222
  5. 2023On the Exploitability of Instruction Tuningcited by 110
  6. 2024Attention Tracker: Detecting Prompt Injection Attacks in LLMscited by 82
  7. 2026Agent Skills: A Data-Driven Analysis of Claude Skills for Extending Large Language Model Functionalitycited by 66
  8. 2024Instruction Backdoor Attacks Against Customized LLMscited by 50
  9. 2020Maximum Mean Discrepancy Test is Aware of Adversarial Attackscited by 44
  10. 2026BadSkill: Backdoor Attacks on Agent Skills via Model-in-Skill Poisoningcited by 25
  11. 2023Does Few-shot Learning Suffer from Backdoor Attacks?cited by 19
  12. 2025Oyster-I: Beyond Refusal -- Constructive Safety Alignment for Responsible Language Modelscited by 19
1 more
  1. 2025An LLM-based Quantitative Framework for Evaluating High-Stealthy Backdoor Risks in OSS Supply Chainscited by 1

Built on by

Not cited yet.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026SkillTrojan: Backdoor Attacks on Skill-Based Agent Systems
  2. 2026BackdoorAgent: A Unified Framework for Backdoor Attacks on LLM-based Agents
  3. 2025Your Agent Can Defend Itself against Backdoor Attacks
  4. 2026Convergent Detour Hijacking: Task-Preserving Resource Amplification in Skill-Based LLM Agents
  5. 2026Query-Only Backdoor Attacks on Self-Evolving Skills via Trajectory Poisoning
  6. 2026Sleeper Cell: Injecting Latent Malice Temporal Backdoors into Tool-Using LLMs
  7. 2026SkillAttack: Automated Red Teaming of Agent Skills through Attack Path Refinement
  8. 2026SkillBloat: Token Amplification Attacks via Skill Injection in LLM Coding Agents