mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Agent Audit: A Security Analysis System for LLM Agent Applications

arXiv 2603.22853 ↗First posted 24 Mar 2026cs.CR cs.AIcited by 8

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

What should a developer inspect before deploying an LLM agent: the model, the tool code, the deployment configuration, or all three? In practice, many security failures in agent systems arise not from model weights alone, but from the surrounding software stack: tool functions that pass untrusted inputs to dangerous operations, exposed credentials in deployment artifacts, and over-privileged Model Context Protocol (MCP) configurations. We present Agent Audit, a security analysis system for LLM agent applications. Agent Audit analyzes Python agent code and deployment artifacts through an agent-aware pipeline that combines dataflow analysis, credential detection, structured configuration parsing, and privilege-risk checks. The system reports findings in terminal, JSON, and SARIF formats, enabling direct integration with local development workflows and CI/CD pipelines. On a benchmark of 22 samples with 42 annotated vulnerabilities, Agent Audit detects 40 vulnerabilities with 6 false positives, substantially improving recall over common SAST baselines while maintaining sub-second scan times. Agent Audit is open source and installable via pip, making security auditing accessible for agent systems. In the live demonstration, attendees scan vulnerable agent repositories and observe how Agent Audit identifies security risks in tool functions, prompts, and more. Findings are linked to source locations and configuration paths, and can be exported into VS Code and GitHub Code Scanning for interactive inspection.

Key facts. Cited by 8 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 2 of its 17 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 24 Mar 2026.

Builds on

2 of 17 references.

Closest ancestors · 1

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2024InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents5 Mar

Other references · 1

  1. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,339

Built on by

Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 8.

8 papers.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026Local LLM Agents as Vulnerable Runtimes:A Source-Code Audit of the Agent Runtime Layer
  2. 2025SEC-bench: Automated Benchmarking of LLM Agents on Real-World Software Security Tasks
  3. 2026AgentGuard: An Attribute-Based Access Control Framework for Tool-Use LLM-Based Agent
  4. 2026Who Tests the Testers? Systematic Enumeration and Coverage Audit of LLM Agent Tool Call Safety
  5. 2026AgentProv: Auditing Agentic LLM API Providers via Tool-use Policy Probes
  6. 2026LLM-Based Agents for Software and Systems Security: Approaches, Applications, and Assessment
  7. 2025TraceAegis: Securing LLM-Based Agents via Hierarchical and Behavioral Anomaly Detection
  8. 2025AgentGuard: Repurposing Agentic Orchestrator for Safety Evaluation of Tool Orchestration