mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

When Do Agent Loops Mistake Stagnation for Progress? Self-Evaluation Bias and Externally Grounded Verification in Long-Running Autonomous LLM Agent Loops

arXiv 2607.25152 ↗First posted 27 Jul 2026cs.AIcited by 4

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Software engineering coding agents

Abstract (arXiv)

Long-running autonomous agents plan, act, and judge their own completion without human intervention. When an agent grades its own work, self-evaluation bias takes hold: plausible changes are accepted as progress while real-world outcomes stagnate or regress. We name this failure mode the progress mirage and show, with controlled measurement, that it is a question of what the evaluator is grounded in. We built a testbed that holds the agent and its tool surface fixed and manipulates only the information-channel type of the evaluator that gates the loop. A world-state oracle, unfakeable in principle, is enforced by container and network isolation and verified at every run. Across 54 cycles a frontier agent claimed improvement every time, yet 56 percent had a measured delta of zero or below. Self-report was thus uninformative, and the self-verdict gate degenerated into accept-all, eroding the best deployed state it had reached by 19 percent. Even the strongest in-band judge, reading the full artifact text, the change diff, and its own verdict history, accepted cycles of which 44 percent were real-world regressions and rejected 38 percent of real improvements; the preregistered adversarial hypothesis that a strong judge closes the gap was rejected. On a boundary task whose success specification is verifiable from the artifact itself, the same judge's mirage vanished to zero and the gap collapsed within the registered threshold, showing that the gap depends on where the success signal resides. A sign-only variant returning only the acceptance verdict kept real-world output similar to full feedback (110.0 versus 113.0), locating the benefit in the gate's grounding rather than in feedback content. For open-ended objectives whose success signal lives outside the transcript, scaling up the judge is not enough; out-of-band evaluation with real-world access is a structural requirement.

Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Software engineering coding agents, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 13 of its 19 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 27 Jul 2026.

Builds on

13 of 19 references.

Closest ancestors · 2

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026SpecBench: Measuring Reward Hacking in Long-Horizon Coding Agents20 May
  2. 2024SWE-agent: Agent-Computer Interfaces Enable Automated Software Engineering6 May

Other references · 11

  1. 2022ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Modelscited by 8,355
  2. 2023SWE-bench: Can Language Models Resolve Real-World GitHub Issues?cited by 3,193
  3. 2024τ-bench: A Benchmark for Tool-Agent-User Interaction in Real-World Domainscited by 1,280
  4. 2022Scaling Laws for Reward Model Overoptimizationcited by 1,056
  5. 2023Large Language Models Cannot Self-Correct Reasoning Yetcited by 965
  6. 2024LLM Evaluators Recognize and Favor Their Own Generationscited by 651
  7. 2023Weak-to-Strong Generalization: Eliciting Strong Capabilities With Weak Supervisioncited by 445
  8. 2018AI safety via debatecited by 384
  9. 2025Monitoring Reasoning Models for Misbehavior and the Risks of Promoting Obfuscationcited by 338
  10. 2026Reward Hacking in Language Model Agents: Revisiting AI Safety Gridworldscited by 4
  11. 2026ScopeJudge: Cost-Aware Pre-Execution Gating for Offensive Security Agentscited by 3

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Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 4.

4 papers.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2025SABER: Small Actions, Big Errors -- Safeguarding Mutating Steps in LLM Agents
  2. 2026Maintaining Benchmarks Against Increasingly Capable Agents: Detection and Remediation of Unearned Passes
  3. 2026Do Agent Benchmarks Measure Capability? Protocol Validity in the Age of Agentic AI
  4. 2026On Randomness in Agentic Evals
  5. 2026Self-Authored Verification Is Unreliable in Heuristic Self-Improving Agents
  6. 2026Agents Are Systems, Not Models: Rethinking Agentic Evaluation
  7. 2026The LLM Proposes, the Executive Disposes: A Self-Verifying Agent Instrument that Dissociates Commitment Drift from Binding Drift in Long-Horizon Agents
  8. 2026Safety Does Not Compose: Non-Decaying Loop State for Autonomous LLM Agents