mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

When Are Sparse Feature Interventions Actually Localized? Matched Evaluation for SAE-Based Safety Control

arXiv 2607.10226 ↗First posted 11 Jul 2026cs.AI cs.CRcited by 0

On the map: Mechanistic interpretability → Steering and probing for LLM safety

Abstract (arXiv)

We evaluate when sparse autoencoder (SAE) features act as localized control handles for safety-relevant behavior. This question is difficult because apparent success can arise from weak interventions, mismatched baselines, model robustness, or degenerate outputs that automated safety judges mark as unsafe without representing meaningful harmful compliance. We introduce a matched coherence-gated evaluation protocol for runtime safety interventions: methods are compared at matched target-effect points, and the primary target metric counts harmful compliance only when an output is both judge-unsafe and coherent. Applying this protocol to three prompt splits on Gemma-2-9B-it with a Gemma Scope layer-20 residual SAE, we find that SAE feature ablation has a narrow useful regime. SAE top800 reaches a low-to-mid target effect with lower total perturbation and competitive utility, but SAE top1600 loses utility relative to a matched dense refusal-direction baseline, and SAE top3200 primarily induces coherence collapse. Human audit confirms that coherence gating removes unsafe-only artifacts, and feature diagnostics show that the useful regime is driven by a stable head of refusal-aligned features whose activation separation decays rapidly with rank. These results argue that SAE-based safety interventions should be evaluated as regime-dependent control mechanisms rather than assumed to be uniformly localized.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Steering and probing for LLM safety, one of 13 directions in Mechanistic interpretability. Builds on 8 of its 17 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 11 Jul 2026.

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8 of 17 references.

References · 8

  1. 2021Training Verifiers to Solve Math Word Problemscited by 10,109
  2. 2024HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusalcited by 1,429
  3. 2023Representation Engineering: A Top-Down Approach to AI Transparencycited by 1,336
  4. 2024Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Directioncited by 1,032
  5. 2023Steering Language Models With Activation Engineeringcited by 922
  6. 2023XSTest: A Test Suite for Identifying Exaggerated Safety Behaviours in Large Language Modelscited by 505
  7. 2024Gemma Scope: Open Sparse Autoencoders Everywhere All At Once on Gemma 2cited by 394
  8. 2024WildTeaming at Scale: From In-the-Wild Jailbreaks to (Adversarially) Safer Language Modelscited by 223

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  1. 2025Feature-Guided SAE Steering for Refusal-Rate Control using Contrasting Prompts
  2. 2026SAE Interventions are Unreliable: Post-Intervention Recovery of Suppressed Behavior
  3. 2025Graph-Regularized Sparse Autoencoders for LLM Safety Steering
  4. 2024Steering Language Model Refusal with Sparse Autoencoders
  5. 2025Sparse Autoencoder Features for Classifications and Transferability
  6. 2026Pre-Intervention Prediction of Sparse Autoencoder Steering Side Effects
  7. 2024Evaluating Sparse Autoencoders on Targeted Concept Erasure Tasks
  8. 2026Sparse Autoencoders Encode Both Concepts and Functions: The Downstream Geometry of Feature Effects