One Polluted Page Is Enough: Evaluating Web Content Pollution in LLM Recommenders
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Abstract (arXiv)
Search-augmented LLMs increasingly mediate everyday consumer recommendations by retrieving live web content. This creates a new risk: LLM recommenders may consume web content that Generative Engine Optimization (GEO) operators have polluted to mislead them. We ask: to what extent do they become unwitting promoters of fake products? We introduce FORGE (Fake Online Recommendations in Generative Environments), which locally rewrites real products in a frozen set of retrieved web pages into fake ones and measures how often the LLM recommends the fake product, across 225 real products in 15 categories and 5 consumer scenarios. Across 12 commercial and open-weights LLMs, all models are vulnerable: a single polluted page yields fooled rates of up to 27%, while the full top-3 replacement raises this to 73.8%. Vulnerability varies across categories, increasing when models lack stable prior knowledge of the products. Reasoning does not mitigate this vulnerability; instead, it often generates spurious social proof to justify false recommendations. None of the four defenses is adequate: the skepticism prompt can exacerbate vulnerability much like reasoning, the two consensus filters risk suppressing legitimate products, and credibility re-ranking helps every model but removes only a sixth of the fakes. We release the FORGE benchmark and the evaluation code at https://github.com/leoluolol/forge-benchmark.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 23 of its 40 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 11 Jun 2026.
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References · 23
- 2023Lost in the Middle: How Language Models Use Long Contextscited by 3,383
- 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,339
- 2022When Not to Trust Language Models: Investigating Effectiveness of Parametric and Non-Parametric Memoriescited by 1,103
- 2026DeepSeek-V4: Towards Highly Efficient Million-Token Context Intelligencecited by 877
- 2023C-Eval: A Multi-Level Multi-Discipline Chinese Evaluation Suite for Foundation Modelscited by 694
- 2025GLM-4.5V and GLM-4.1V-Thinking: Towards Versatile Multimodal Reasoning with Scalable Reinforcement Learningcited by 439
- 2023CMMLU: Measuring massive multitask language understanding in Chinesecited by 436
- 2021Entity-Based Knowledge Conflicts in Question Answeringcited by 349
- 2023TALLRec: An Effective and Efficient Tuning Framework to Align Large Language Model with Recommendationcited by 336
- 2023Adaptive Chameleon or Stubborn Sloth: Revealing the Behavior of Large Language Models in Knowledge Conflictscited by 333
- 2023FreshLLMs: Refreshing Large Language Models with Search Engine Augmentationcited by 308
- 2023Large Language Models are Zero-Shot Rankers for Recommender Systemscited by 307
11 more
- 2024Knowledge Conflicts for LLMs: A Surveycited by 274
- 2023Is ChatGPT a Good Recommender? A Preliminary Studycited by 192
- 2023Poisoning Retrieval Corpora by Injecting Adversarial Passagescited by 153
- 2023Beyond Factuality: A Comprehensive Evaluation of Large Language Models as Knowledge Generatorscited by 42
- 2024Adversarial Search Engine Optimization for Large Language Modelscited by 37
- 2025Poison-RAG: Adversarial Data Poisoning Attacks on Retrieval-Augmented Generation in Recommender Systemscited by 32
- 2024Ranking Manipulation for Conversational Search Enginescited by 23
- 2025Vulnerability-Aware Alignment: Mitigating Uneven Forgetting in Harmful Fine-Tuningcited by 17
- 2025What Generative Search Engines Like and How to Optimize Web Content Cooperativelycited by 13
- 2025StealthRank: LLM Ranking Manipulation via Stealthy Prompt Optimizationcited by 10
- 2025Stealthy LLM-Driven Data Poisoning Attacks Against Embedding-Based Retrieval-Augmented Recommender Systemscited by 8
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