Context-Fractured Decomposition Attacks on Tool-Using LLM Agents: Exploiting Artifact Provenance Gaps
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
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Abstract (arXiv)
Tool-using LLM agents interact with the world through actions that persist state in artifacts (e.g., workspace files or logs). Consequently, jailbreak defenses must reason about cross-step composition rather than isolated text. Yet most existing attacks and defenses, including ``multi-turn'' jailbreaks such as Crescendo and Tree of Attacks,still assume a single contiguous conversation visible to the defender. This assumption breaks down in real agent pipelines, where enforcement is fragmented across tools, modules, and time, and where artifact provenance is often not tracked. We operationalize a deployment failure mode for tool-using LLM agents, the provenance gap, and study reproducible triggers for it: Context-Fractured Decomposition (CFD), a family of cross-context multi-step jailbreaks that preserve benign-looking intermediate artifacts from an early interaction and elicit harmful behavior much later, potentially in a different agent instance or workflow stage, via individually innocuous tool actions whose risk emerges only under delayed artifact-mediated composition. We instrument the failure mode with trace-level diagnostics and outline a verifiable mitigation direction (provenance lineage tagging). Across agent-system jailbreak benchmarks, CFD improves success rates by up to 28.3 percentage points over state-of-the-art baselines, even against strong single-turn judges. Disclaimer: This paper contains examples of harmful or offensive language.
Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 19 of its 35 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 8 Jun 2026.
Builds on
19 of 35 references.
Closest ancestors · 9
Same direction, newest first
- 2025Memory Injection Attacks on LLM Agents via Query-Only Interaction5 Mar
- 2025Unveiling Privacy Risks in LLM Agent Memory17 Feb
- 2024Refusal-Trained LLMs Are Easily Jailbroken As Browser Agents11 Oct
- 2024AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents11 Oct
- 2024Prompt Infection: LLM-to-LLM Prompt Injection within Multi-Agent Systems9 Oct
- 2024Agent Security Bench (ASB): Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in LLM-based Agents3 Oct
- 2024Breaking Agents: Compromising Autonomous LLM Agents Through Malfunction Amplification30 Jul
- 2024AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Bases17 Jul
- 2024BadRobot: Jailbreaking Embodied LLM Agents in the Physical World16 Jul
Other references · 10
- 2023Toolformer: Language Models Can Teach Themselves to Use Toolscited by 4,072
- 2022Do As I Can, Not As I Say: Grounding Language in Robotic Affordancescited by 2,302
- 2023Tree of Attacks: Jailbreaking Black-Box LLMs Automaticallycited by 619
- 2023Prompt Injection attack against LLM-integrated Applicationscited by 568
- 2024Jailbreaking Leading Safety-Aligned LLMs with Simple Adaptive Attackscited by 450
- 2024Great, Now Write an Article About That: The Crescendo Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreak Attackcited by 364
- 2023GPT4Tools: Teaching Large Language Model to Use Tools via Self-instructioncited by 245
- 2023Benchmarking and Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on Large Language Modelscited by 237
- 2024LLM Defenses Are Not Robust to Multi-Turn Human Jailbreaks Yetcited by 145
- 2025When MCP Servers Attack: Taxonomy, Feasibility, and Mitigationcited by 17
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Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.
1 paper.
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026PACE: Provenance-Aware Capability Enforcement for Tool-Using LLM Agents
- 2026The Granularity Mismatch in Agent Security: Argument-Level Provenance Solves Enforcement and Isolates the LLM Reasoning Bottleneck
- 2026From Agent Traces to Trust: A Survey of Evidence Tracing and Execution Provenance in LLM Agents
- 2026Causality Laundering: Denial-Feedback Leakage in Tool-Calling LLM Agents
- 2026ContainmentBench: Trace-Based Evaluation of Post-Exposure Containment in Tool-Using LLM Agents
- 2026Structurally Close, Temporally Distant: Measuring Security Exposure in Long-Horizon LLM Agents
- 2026ChainCaps: Composition-Safe Tool-Using Agents via Monotonic Capability Attenuation
- 2026SafeClawBench: Separating Semantic, Audit-Evidence, and Sandbox Harm in Tool-Using LLM Agents