mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Jailbreak Context Lingers: Divergent Safety Routing and Its Cross-Task Predictability in Tool Agents

arXiv 2609.34686 ↗First posted 28 Sep 2026cs.AIcited by 0

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

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Abstract (arXiv)

As large language models increasingly operate as tool-using agents, post-jailbreak safety feedback is often assumed to serve as a reliable safeguard; however, how lingering jailbreak context shapes subsequent agent behavior remains largely unexplored. To systematically examine this dynamic, we introduce a paired continuation framework across 192 parent tasks spanning 42 domains, evaluating 12,148 analyzed continuation pairs (curated from a 12,288-pair initially design) across eight diverse agents. We find that identical safety feedback induces sharply model-dependent behavioral routing rather than uniform protection: redirecting unsafe trajectories toward legitimate completion (rescue), sustaining unauthorized execution (persistent unsafe), or triggering over-refusal on benign tasks (collateral loss). Through layer-wise activation patching, we discover a shared late-commit pattern where causal intervention effects surge sharply near the final layers (relative depths of 0.958--0.984) despite an over 30-fold variation in peak magnitude across architectures. Crucially, critical-layer representations correlate with macroscopic routing outcomes, and intervening at these layers causally alters concrete next-step tool actions. Building on this causal foundation, we test whether localized intervention-derived features can serve as predictive proxies for full-trajectory routing outcomes on unseen parent tasks under leave-one-parent-task-out evaluation, finding that they provide viable predictive signals in responsive agents with peak ROC AUCs reaching 0.675 for rescue, 0.777 for collateral loss, and 0.702 for persistent unsafe. These findings establish a mechanistic lens and a predictive baseline for anticipating the safety and utility trade-offs of post-jailbreak feedback in autonomous agents.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 26 of its 31 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 28 Sep 2026.

Builds on

26 of 31 references.

Closest ancestors · 9

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026AgentLens: Interpretable Safety Steering via Mechanistic Subspaces for Multi-Turn Coding Agent21 Jun
  2. 2026Context-Fractured Decomposition Attacks on Tool-Using LLM Agents: Exploiting Artifact Provenance Gaps8 Jun
  3. 2026From Risk Classification to Action Plan Remediation: A Guardrail Feedback Driven Framework for LLM Agents4 Jun
  4. 2026Learning When to Act or Refuse: Guarding Agentic Reasoning Models for Safe Multi-Step Tool Use3 Mar
  5. 2026Unsafer in Many Turns: Benchmarking and Defending Multi-Turn Safety Risks in Tool-Using Agents13 Feb
  6. 2026AIR: Improving Agent Safety through Incident Response12 Feb
  7. 2026ToolSafe: Enhancing Tool Invocation Safety of LLM-based agents via Proactive Step-level Guardrail and Feedback15 Jan
  8. 2025STAC: When Innocent Tools Form Dangerous Chains for LLM Agents30 Sep
  9. 2023Identifying the Risks of LM Agents with an LM-Emulated Sandbox25 Sep

Other references · 17

  1. 2024The Llama 3 Herd of Modelscited by 14,192
  2. 2025Qwen3 Technical Reportcited by 8,195
  3. 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Modelscited by 2,914
  4. 2022Locating and Editing Factual Associations in GPTcited by 2,609
  5. 2025Gemma 3 Technical Reportcited by 1,686
  6. 2023Tree of Attacks: Jailbreaking Black-Box LLMs Automaticallycited by 619
  7. 2024Safety Alignment Should Be Made More Than Just a Few Tokens Deepcited by 450
  8. 2024How to use and interpret activation patchingcited by 191
  9. 2026Gemma 4 Technical Reportcited by 187
  10. 2025LLMs Encode Harmfulness and Refusal Separatelycited by 75
  11. 2025Jailbreak Transferability Emerges from Shared Representationscited by 5
  12. 2026State-Dependent Safety Failures in Multi-Turn Language Model Interactioncited by 4
5 more
  1. 2026Safety Recovery in Reasoning Models Is Only a Few Early Steering Steps Awaycited by 3
  2. 2026Don't Blindly Trust It: How Unreliable Feedback Breaks Tool-Using LLM Agentscited by 3
  3. 2026Feedback That Backfires: Why Small Language Model Agents Repeat the Call They Just Watched Failcited by 2
  4. 2026The Struggle Between Continuation and Refusal: A Mechanistic Analysis of the Continuation-Triggered Jailbreak in LLMscited by 1
  5. 2026History Anchors: How Prior Behavior Steers LLM Decisions Toward Unsafe Actionscited by 1

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  2. 2026Knowing without Acting: The Disentangled Geometry of Safety Mechanisms in Large Language Models
  3. 2026Safety-Potential Pruning for Enhancing Safety Prompts Against VLM Jailbreaking Without Retraining
  4. 2026When Safety Routing Breaks: Understanding Alignment Fragility under Benign Fine-Tuning
  5. 2026SoK: Rethinking Jailbreaking in the Era of Agentic AI: Attacks, Defenses, and Practical Consideration
  6. 2026Mind the GAP: Text Safety Does Not Transfer to Tool-Call Safety in LLM Agents
  7. 2026When Skills Meet Safety: Benchmarking and Characterizing the Adaptive Jailbreak Robustness of Skill-Merged LLMs
  8. 2025SafeBehavior: Simulating Human-Like Multistage Reasoning to Mitigate Jailbreak Attacks in Large Language Models