mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

ClawHub Security Signals: When VirusTotal, Static Analysis, and SkillSpector Disagree

arXiv 2606.01494 ↗First posted 31 May 2026cs.CR cs.AI cs.SEcited by 4

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Abstract (arXiv)

Agent skills extend AI agents with reusable instructions, tools, scripts, references, and workflows, establishing a security boundary distinct from both model safety and traditional package-malware detection. ClawHub Security Signals is a sanitized dataset of 67,453 latest public OpenClaw skill versions. Each row pairs redacted SKILL.md content and sanitized bundled files where present with a final ClawScan registry verdict and evidence from three scanner families: VirusTotal, static heuristic analysis, and NVIDIA SkillSpector. Rather than estimating malicious-skill prevalence, we study scanner disagreement. The three scanners rarely flag the same skills: any pair overlaps on at most 10.4% of their combined positives, only 0.69% of skills are flagged by all three, and 81.9% of flagged skills are identified by a single scanner. The disagreement is structured by attack surface. SkillSpector, which raises semantic agentic-risk advisories rather than malware-reputation signals, is positive for 19,209 of 25,504 suspicious rows (75.3%) but only 14 of 206 malicious rows (6.8%). The malicious-verdict region shows the inverse profile: 150 of 206 malicious rows (72.8%) are VirusTotal-positive, consistent with bundled-code malware evidence. These results show that agent-skill security requires layered governance, not single-scanner allow/block decisions. The corpus is released as a sanitized silver-standard dataset: labels are the registry's automated verdicts, not human-annotated ground truth, and the release represents an early, versioned snapshot intended to support the community while a human-annotated subset is developed. Further research is encouraged, including models tailored for skill-security triage.

Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 12 of its 46 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 31 May 2026.

Builds on

12 of 46 references.

References · 12

  1. 2023Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arenacited by 8,393
  2. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,339
  3. 2022Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Modelscited by 760
  4. 2017Snorkel: Rapid Training Data Creation with Weak Supervisioncited by 370
  5. 2024LLM Agents can Autonomously Exploit One-day Vulnerabilitiescited by 125
  6. 2024LLM Agents can Autonomously Hack Websitescited by 108
  7. 2025MCP Safety Audit: LLMs with the Model Context Protocol Allow Major Security Exploitscited by 61
  8. 2020Backstabber's Knife Collection: A Review of Open Source Software Supply Chain Attackscited by 57
  9. 2023LLM Platform Security: Applying a Systematic Evaluation Framework to OpenAI's ChatGPT Pluginscited by 49
  10. 2019Small World with High Risks: A Study of Security Threats in the npm Ecosystemcited by 36
  11. 2023An Empirical Study of Malicious Code In PyPI Ecosystemcited by 18
  12. 2025Mind the Metrics: Patterns for Telemetry-Aware In-IDE AI Application Development using the Model Context Protocol (MCP)cited by 4

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Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 4.

4 papers.

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  1. 2026SkillGate: Cost Efficient Runtime Malicious Skill File Detection in Coding Agents
  2. 2026SkillSieve: A Hierarchical Triage Framework for Detecting Malicious AI Agent Skills
  3. 2026Benchmarking Security Risk Detection and Verification in Open Agentic Skill Ecosystems
  4. 2026MalSkillBench: A Runtime-Verified Benchmark of Malicious Agent Skills
  5. 2026SkillsMetric: Mapping the Detection Boundary of Static Analysis for Malicious Agent Skills
  6. 2026SkillVetBench: LLM-as-Judge for Multi-Dimensional Security Risk Evaluation in Open-Source LLM Agent Skills
  7. 2026SkillSecurer: Detecting and Patching Prompt-Injection Vulnerabilities in AI Agent Skills
  8. 2026Pretext: Defeating Malicious Skill Detection Frameworks for AI Agents