BioRefusalAudit: Auditing Biosecurity Refusal Depth Using General and Domain-Fine-Tuned Sparse Autoencoders
On the map: Mechanistic interpretability → Steering and probing for LLM safety
Abstract (arXiv)
Biosecurity evaluations of language models typically ask whether models produce hazardous output. This paper asks a complementary question: when a model refuses, is that refusal structurally sound, or does it disappear under modest changes to prompt framing, formatting, or output length? Across five architectures, no model cleanly discriminated benign from hazard. Gemma 2 2B-IT never genuinely refused across 75 prompts, hedging on every hazard-adjacent query. Gemma 4 E2B-IT refused 65/75 prompts with chat-template formatting and 0/75 without it. Both Gemma models collapsed to 0% under an 80-token cap. Qwen 2.5 1.5B and Phi-3-mini over-refused, flagging 83-87% of benign biology as hazardous. Llama 3.2 1B showed the only meaningful tier gradient (61-point spread). To probe what drives such over-refusal, we tested a panel of Schedule I but biologically non-toxic compounds (notably psilocybin cultivation, with FDA Breakthrough Therapy status). Some models refused these at rates exceeding genuinely hazardous biology, suggesting refusal tracks legality and cultural salience over CBRN hazard. To measure the internal side, we introduce a divergence score D comparing a model's surface response label to its internal sparse autoencoder (SAE) feature activations. Full D was computed on Gemma 2 2B-IT (Gemma Scope 1) and Gemma 4 E2B-IT (author-trained bio SAE). Two fine-tuned Gemma 2 domain SAEs were released. On Gemma 4, comply and refuse responses separated by a 0.647-point gap with zero overlap (n=75), though this is preliminary, with a narrow catalog, within-sample calibration, and Gemma-family-only SAE coverage. Built over one hackathon weekend on consumer hardware (GTX 1650 Ti Max-Q, plus Colab T4 for SAE training), this preliminary evidence suggests activation-level auditing may surface failure modes invisible to behavioral evaluation, with substantial variation across architectures.
Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Steering and probing for LLM safety, one of 13 directions in Mechanistic interpretability. Builds on 8 of its 10 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 28 May 2026.
Builds on
8 of 10 references.
References · 8
- 2023Sparse Autoencoders Find Highly Interpretable Features in Language Modelscited by 1,420
- 2024Sleeper Agents: Training Deceptive LLMs that Persist Through Safety Trainingcited by 529
- 2024The WMDP Benchmark: Measuring and Reducing Malicious Use With Unlearningcited by 509
- 2024Safety Alignment Should Be Made More Than Just a Few Tokens Deepcited by 472
- 2024Sparse Feature Circuits: Discovering and Editing Interpretable Causal Graphs in Language Modelscited by 435
- 2024Gemma Scope: Open Sparse Autoencoders Everywhere All At Once on Gemma 2cited by 394
- 2024Jumping Ahead: Improving Reconstruction Fidelity with JumpReLU Sparse Autoencoderscited by 300
- 2024LAB-Bench: Measuring Capabilities of Language Models for Biology Researchcited by 156
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.
1 paper.
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026A Blind Spot in Alignment: Quantifying Biosecurity Risks in Large Language Models
- 2026BioSecBench-Refusal: A paired metric for performance and alignment in agentic biosecurity risk assessment
- 2026The Refusal--Compliance Tradeoff: A Large-Scale Safety Behavior Audit of Large Language Models
- 2025Forbidden Science: Dual-Use AI Challenge Benchmark and Scientific Refusal Tests
- 2026Refuse without Refusal: A Structural Analysis of Safety-Tuning Responses for Reducing False Refusals in Language Models
- 2025Steering Over-refusals Towards Safety in Retrieval Augmented Generation
- 2026Do Language Models Know When They'll Refuse? Probing Introspective Awareness of Safety Boundaries
- 2026Health-ORSC-Bench: A Benchmark for Measuring Over-Refusal and Safety Completion in Health Context