mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Relevance as a Vulnerability: How Web Retrieval Degrades Safety Alignment in LLM Agents

arXiv 2605.29224 ↗First posted 28 May 2026cs.CL cs.AI cs.CRcited by 0

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

also in 2 more
Abstract (arXiv)

AI agents augment large language models with external tools such as web retrieval, enabling grounded and up-to-date responses. However, incorporating external content into the generation pipeline can weaken the safety alignment mechanisms that govern model outputs. Prior work shows that enabling retrieval in agents increases compliance with harmful requests. We introduce AgentREVEAL, a diagnostic framework for analyzing retrieval-induced safety degradation in LLM agents. The framework examines two axes: how retrieval is integrated into the agent pipeline and the properties of the retrieved content. Along the integration axis, we find that binding tool invocation and response generation in a single step amplifies harmful outputs. Along the content axis, we uncover the Safe Source Paradox: even oppositional or safety-oriented sources, such as pages containing warnings or risk disclaimers, can increase harmful compliance by an average of 25% compared to the no-retrieval baseline. Finally, we show that relevance acts as a shared activation condition for both vulnerabilities. Similar patterns appear on frontier closed models, and harmful compliance remains elevated under several representative pipeline interventions, with some agents also entering this regime under autonomous retrieval. Because relevance is also what makes retrieval useful, these results expose a safety-utility trade-off for retrieval-enabled agents. We introduce HarmURLBench, a benchmark containing 1,405 real-world URLs paired with 320 harmful behaviors to support future evaluations.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 34 of its 46 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 28 May 2026.

Builds on

34 of 46 references.

Closest ancestors · 11

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025SafeSearch: Do Not Trade Safety for Utility in LLM Search Agents19 Oct
  2. 2025OpenAgentSafety: A Comprehensive Framework for Evaluating Real-World AI Agent Safety8 Jul
  3. 2025DRIFT: Dynamic Rule-Based Defense with Injection Isolation for Securing LLM Agents13 Jun
  4. 2025A Survey on the Safety and Security Threats of Computer-Using Agents: JARVIS or Ultron?16 May
  5. 2025X-Teaming: Multi-Turn Jailbreaks and Defenses with Adaptive Multi-Agents15 Apr
  6. 2025SafeArena: Evaluating the Safety of Autonomous Web Agents6 Mar
  7. 2025Why Are Web AI Agents More Vulnerable Than Standalone LLMs? A Security Analysis27 Feb
  8. 2025RTBAS: Defending LLM Agents Against Prompt Injection and Privacy Leakage13 Feb
  9. 2024From Allies to Adversaries: Manipulating LLM Tool-Calling through Adversarial Injection13 Dec
  10. 2024ST-WebAgentBench: A Benchmark for Evaluating Safety and Trustworthiness in Web Agents9 Oct
  11. 2024The Dark Side of Function Calling: Pathways to Jailbreaking Large Language Models25 Jul

Other references · 23

  1. 2022Training language models to follow instructions with human feedbackcited by 15,971
  2. 2023Llama 2: Open Foundation and Fine-Tuned Chat Modelscited by 13,028
  3. 2020Retrieval-Augmented Generation for Knowledge-Intensive NLP Taskscited by 9,297
  4. 2022ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Modelscited by 8,695
  5. 2023Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arenacited by 8,626
  6. 2023Efficient Memory Management for Large Language Model Serving with PagedAttentioncited by 5,944
  7. 2023Toolformer: Language Models Can Teach Themselves to Use Toolscited by 4,182
  8. 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Modelscited by 3,104
  9. 2022Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedbackcited by 3,050
  10. 2017TriviaQA: A Large Scale Distantly Supervised Challenge Dataset for Reading Comprehensioncited by 2,955
  11. 2023ToolLLM: Facilitating Large Language Models to Master 16000+ Real-world APIscited by 1,947
  12. 2021WebGPT: Browser-assisted question-answering with human feedbackcited by 1,745
11 more
  1. 2023Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?cited by 1,651
  2. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,443
  3. 2023The Rise and Potential of Large Language Model Based Agents: A Surveycited by 1,439
  4. 2024HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusalcited by 1,429
  5. 2023Llama Guard: LLM-based Input-Output Safeguard for Human-AI Conversationscited by 1,207
  6. 2021Entity-Based Knowledge Conflicts in Question Answeringcited by 356
  7. 2023Adaptive Chameleon or Stubborn Sloth: Revealing the Behavior of Large Language Models in Knowledge Conflictscited by 341
  8. 2024Knowledge Conflicts for LLMs: A Surveycited by 283
  9. 2024Pandora: Jailbreak GPTs by Retrieval Augmented Generation Poisoningcited by 64
  10. 2025RAR: Setting Knowledge Tripwires for Retrieval Augmented Rejectioncited by 3
  11. 2025RAG Makes Guardrails Unsafe? Investigating Robustness of Guardrails under RAG-style Contextscited by 3

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  3. 2026Risk-Aware Reranking for Agentic Tool Retrieval
  4. 2025SafeSearch: Automated Red-Teaming of LLM-Based Search Agents
  5. 2026Retrieval Collapses When AI Pollutes the Web
  6. 2025Unintended Misalignment from Agentic Fine-Tuning: Risks and Mitigation
  7. 2026Agent Retrieval Bench: Evaluating Repository Context Retrieval for Coding Agents
  8. 2026How Much Can We Trust LLM Search Agents? Measuring Endorsement Vulnerability to Web Content Manipulation