The Misattribution Gap: When Memory Poisoning Looks Like Model Failure in Agentic AI Systems
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
Multi-agent AI pipelines typically assume that agent misconduct originates from model misalignment. We identify a structural failure in this assumption, the Misattribution Gap, where memory-layer attacks produce behaviors indistinguishable from model failure, causing defenders to apply the wrong remediation. We formalize Semantic Norm Drift (SND) as a third path to agent misconduct, distinct from emergent misalignment and collusion. In SND, a policy-formatted document enters a shared vector store through normal uploads and later reappears as trusted system context after provenance is lost through a Trust Laundering Chain. Across 64 documented failures, attribution systems consistently blamed the model. Four safety classifiers, including one trained on memory poisoning, produced zero detections across 510 checkpoints. In 59 of 65 valid cases, agents explicitly cited the injected document as normative authority before complying. The attack requires no trigger, model access, or repeated interaction, achieves full effect within five sessions, and persists indefinitely. We introduce Counterfactual Composition Testing, which identifies the causal entry with 87.5% accuracy and zero false positives, while a forensics baseline fails across all 25 scenarios. We further prove the Retrieval-Coverage Dilemma, showing that stronger evasion inherently weakens the attack, limiting adaptive bypass strategies. Finally, we propose Memory-Persistent Information-Flow Control, which blocks 97% of attacks at the cross-session boundary where prior defenses fail. We release the SND Corpus, the first adversarial memory benchmark with temporal persistence and multi-agent composition across financial and Health Care domains.
Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 23 of its 40 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 12 May 2026.
Builds on
23 of 40 references.
Closest ancestors · 11
Same direction, newest first
- 2025MemoryGraft: Persistent Compromise of LLM Agents via Poisoned Experience Retrieval18 Dec
- 2025Agentic Misalignment: How LLMs Could Be Insider Threats5 Oct
- 2025A-MemGuard: A Proactive Defense Framework for LLM-Based Agent Memory29 Sep
- 2025Safety Degradation in AI Agents20 May
- 2025Securing Agentic AI: A Comprehensive Threat Model and Mitigation Framework for Generative AI Agents28 Apr
- 2025Memory Injection Attacks on LLM Agents via Query-Only Interaction5 Mar
- 2024Agent Security Bench (ASB): Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in LLM-based Agents3 Oct
- 2024AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Bases17 Jul
- 2024InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents5 Mar
- 2024Secret Collusion among AI Agents: Multi-Agent Deception via Steganography12 Feb
- 2023Identifying the Risks of LM Agents with an LM-Emulated Sandbox25 Sep
Other references · 12
- 2024The Llama 3 Herd of Modelscited by 14,715
- 2023WebArena: A Realistic Web Environment for Building Autonomous Agentscited by 2,006
- 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,443
- 2024HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusalcited by 1,429
- 2024τ-bench: A Benchmark for Tool-Agent-User Interaction in Real-World Domainscited by 1,402
- 2024Phi-4 Technical Reportcited by 711
- 2025Why Do Multi-Agent LLM Systems Fail?cited by 604
- 2024WildGuard: Open One-Stop Moderation Tools for Safety Risks, Jailbreaks, and Refusals of LLMscited by 496
- 2024The Instruction Hierarchy: Training LLMs to Prioritize Privileged Instructionscited by 493
- 2025Securing AI Agents with Information-Flow Controlcited by 121
- 2025EchoLeak: The First Real-World Zero-Click Prompt Injection Exploit in a Production LLM Systemcited by 29
- 2026TAME: A Trustworthy Test-Time Evolution of Agent Memory with Systematic Benchmarkingcited by 10
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Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.
1 paper.
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
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- 2026The Containment Gap: How Deployed Agentic AI Frameworks Fail Public-Facing Safety Requirements
- 2026MemSentry: A Framework for Detecting Persistent Memory Poisoning in Agentic AI
- 2026SafeClawBench: Separating Semantic, Audit-Evidence, and Sandbox Harm in Tool-Using LLM Agents
- 2026Adversarial Attacks in Multi-Agent LLM Pipelines: Unveiling Structural Vulnerabilities in Agentic AI Architectures
- 2026From Untrusted Input to Trusted Memory: A Systematic Study of Memory Poisoning Attacks in LLM Agents
- 2026Who&When Pro: Can LLMs Really Attribute Failures in AI Agents?