mlsanityData to 13 Oct 2026

ASPI: Seeking Ambiguity Clarification Amplifies Prompt Injection Vulnerability in LLM Agents

arXiv 2605.17324 ↗First posted 17 May 2026cs.CR cs.AIcited by 1

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

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Abstract (arXiv)

Clarification-seeking behavior is widely regarded as a desirable property of LLM agents, enabling them to resolve ambiguity before acting on underspecified tasks. However, the security implications of this interaction pattern remain unexplored. We investigate whether the transition from standard execution to a clarification-seeking state increases an agent's susceptibility to prompt injection attacks. We introduce ASPI (Ambiguous-State Prompt Injection), a benchmark of 728 task-attack scenarios that isolates clarification as a distinct agent state and measures how this state transition affects vulnerability under controlled conditions. Each benchmark instance is evaluated under matched execution and clarification settings: in the execution setting, the agent acts on a fully specified instruction and encounters adversarial content only through tool-returned data; in the clarification setting, the agent must first request and incorporate additional user input before acting. We evaluate ten frontier LLMs and find that clarification-seeking consistently and substantially amplifies vulnerability. For instance, attack success rises from 1.8% to 34.0% for o3 and from 2.2% to 35.7% for Gemini-3-Flash. A decomposition analysis reveals that this gap reflects both a state-dependent shift in how models process incoming content and a channel-specific effect arising from the agent-solicited clarification interface. These findings demonstrate that standard execution-time security evaluation systematically underestimates the attack surface of interactive agents, and that robustness under fully specified tasks does not translate to robustness under ambiguity. For reproducibility, our data and source code are available at https://github.com/scaleapi/aspi.

Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 13 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 28 of its 37 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 17 May 2026.

Builds on

28 of 37 references.

Closest ancestors · 7

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026ClawGuard: A Runtime Security Framework for Tool-Augmented LLM Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection13 Apr
  2. 2026How Vulnerable Are AI Agents to Indirect Prompt Injections? Insights from a Large-Scale Public Competition16 Mar
  3. 2026AttriGuard: Defeating Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents via Causal Attribution of Tool Invocations11 Mar
  4. 2026AgentSentry: Mitigating Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents via Temporal Causal Diagnostics and Context Purification26 Feb
  5. 2024IsolateGPT: An Execution Isolation Architecture for LLM-Based Agentic Systems8 Mar
  6. 2024InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents5 Mar
  7. 2023Identifying the Risks of LM Agents with an LM-Emulated Sandbox25 Sep

Other references · 21

  1. 2023WebArena: A Realistic Web Environment for Building Autonomous Agentscited by 1,953
  2. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,417
  3. 2023AgentBench: Evaluating LLMs as Agentscited by 1,242
  4. 2022Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Modelscited by 817
  5. 2024The Instruction Hierarchy: Training LLMs to Prioritize Privileged Instructionscited by 477
  6. 2025LLMs Get Lost In Multi-Turn Conversationcited by 418
  7. 2020AmbigQA: Answering Ambiguous Open-domain Questionscited by 386
  8. 2024TheAgentCompany: Benchmarking LLM Agents on Consequential Real World Taskscited by 313
  9. 2023Benchmarking and Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on Large Language Modelscited by 261
  10. 2024Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks With Spotlightingcited by 258
  11. 2023Clarify When Necessary: Resolving Ambiguity Through Interaction with LMscited by 95
  12. 2024OfficeBench: Benchmarking Language Agents across Multiple Applications for Office Automationcited by 68
9 more
  1. 2025QuestBench: Can LLMs ask the right question to acquire information in reasoning tasks?cited by 60
  2. 2020ConvAI3: Generating Clarifying Questions for Open-Domain Dialogue Systems (ClariQ)cited by 56
  3. 2025OdysseyBench: Evaluating LLM Agents on Long-Horizon Complex Office Application Workflowscited by 55
  4. 2026MCP-Atlas: A Large-Scale Benchmark for Tool-Use Competency with Real MCP Serverscited by 47
  5. 2025Structured Uncertainty guided Clarification for LLM Agentscited by 38
  6. 2025Defending Against Prompt Injection With a Few DefensiveTokenscited by 32
  7. 2026Ask or Assume? Uncertainty-Aware Clarification-Seeking in Coding Agentscited by 18
  8. 2026ASTRA-bench: Evaluating Tool-Use Agent Reasoning and Action Planning with Personal User Contextcited by 14
  9. 2026Value of Information: A Framework for Human-Agent Communicationcited by 10

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Cited by year (2026 to 13 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.

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Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026The Landscape of Prompt Injection Threats in LLM Agents: From Taxonomy to Analysis
  2. 2026Silent Failures in Agentic Security Evaluation: A Validated Harness for Tool-Call Mediation Under Indirect Prompt Injection
  3. 2026Skill-Inject: Measuring Agent Vulnerability to Skill File Attacks
  4. 2026Defusing Explosive Prompts: Understanding and Preventing Trigger-Based Prompt Injections in LLM Agents
  5. 2026Assessing Automated Prompt Injection Attacks in Agentic Environments
  6. 2026Prompted to Discriminate: Generalizing Malicious-Input Probes in the Wild
  7. 2026RAISED: Self-Distillation for Robustness to Prompt Injection in LLM Agents
  8. 2026AgentSecBench: Measuring Prompt Injection, Privacy Leakage, and Tool-Use Integrity in LLM Agents