mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

MemLineage: Lineage-Guided Enforcement for LLM Agent Memory

arXiv 2605.14421 ↗First posted 14 May 2026cs.CR cs.AIcited by 14

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

We introduce MemLineage, a defense for LLM agent memory that attaches both cryptographic provenance and LLM-mediated derivation lineage to every entry. Recent and concurrent work shows that untrusted content can be written into persistent agent state and re-enter later sessions as an instruction; the remaining systems question is how to preserve useful memory recall while preventing such state from justifying sensitive actions. MemLineage treats this as a chain-of-custody problem rather than a filtering problem. It is a six-module design around an RFC-6962 Merkle log over per-principal Ed25519-signed entries: a weighted derivation DAG records which retrieved entries influenced each new memory, and a max-of-strong-edges propagation rule makes Untrusted-Path Persistence hold for any chain whose attribution edges remain above threshold. The sensitive-action gate then refuses dispatches whose active justification descends from an external ancestor, while still allowing benign recall. We evaluate three defense cells against three memory-poisoning workloads on a deterministic mechanism-isolation harness; MemLineage is the only configuration in that harness that drives all three columns to zero ASR, while sub-millisecond per-operation overhead keeps it well below the noise floor of any LLM call. A Codex-backed AgentDojo bridge further separates strong-model behavior from defense-layer behavior: under an intentionally vulnerable tool-output profile, no-defense and signature-only baselines fail on all six banking pairs, while all MemLineage rows reduce strict AgentDojo ASR to zero. The core deterministic artifacts are byte-equal CI-verified; hosted-model AgentDojo and live-model sweeps are recorded as auditable logs rather than byte-pinned artifacts.

Key facts. Cited by 14 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 14 of its 45 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 14 May 2026.

Builds on

14 of 45 references.

Closest ancestors · 9

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026Injection-Execution Dissociation: A Mechanistic Evaluation of Persistent Memory Attacks and Defenses in Stateful LLM Agents8 May
  2. 2026Autonomous LLM Agent Worms: Cross-Platform Propagation, Automated Discovery and Temporal Re-Entry Defense4 May
  3. 2026Ghost in the Agent: Redefining Information Flow Tracking for LLM Agents25 Apr
  4. 2026Zombie Agents: Persistent Control of Self-Evolving LLM Agents via Self-Reinforcing Injections17 Feb
  5. 2025MemoryGraft: Persistent Compromise of LLM Agents via Poisoned Experience Retrieval18 Dec
  6. 2025Taxonomy, Evaluation and Exploitation of IPI-Centric LLM Agent Defense Frameworks19 Nov
  7. 2025A-MemGuard: A Proactive Defense Framework for LLM-Based Agent Memory29 Sep
  8. 2025Memory Injection Attacks on LLM Agents via Query-Only Interaction5 Mar
  9. 2024AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Bases17 Jul

Other references · 5

  1. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,339
  2. 2025Securing AI Agents with Information-Flow Controlcited by 108
  3. 2019Neutaint: Efficient Dynamic Taint Analysis with Neural Networkscited by 7
  4. 2025RAGPart & RAGMask: Retrieval-Stage Defenses Against Corpus Poisoning in Retrieval-Augmented Generationcited by 3
  5. 2024Analyzing Challenges in Deployment of the SLSA Framework for Software Supply Chain Securitycited by 2

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Citing papers per year: 2026: 14.

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  1. 2026A Survey on Long-Term Memory Security in LLM Agents: Attacks, Defenses, and Governance Across the Memory Lifecycle
  2. 2026Memory Provenance Laundering in LLM Agents: A Non-Amplification Firewall for Persistent Memory
  3. 2026SMSR: Certified Defence Against Runtime Memory Poisoning in Persistent LLM Agent Systems
  4. 2026AgentSys: Secure and Dynamic LLM Agents Through Explicit Hierarchical Memory Management
  5. 2026MemSecBench: Tracking Agent Memory Poisoning from Persistence to Consequence and Repair
  6. 2026MemMark: State-Evolution Attribution Watermarking for Agent Long-Term Memory Systems
  7. 2026MemTX: Transactional Belief Commit for Stateful Agent Memory
  8. 2026Agent Memory Is a Surface for Endogenous Authorization Laundering