Adversarial Update-Based Federated Unlearning for Poisoned Model Recovery
On the map: LLM safety and security → Federated unlearning and poisoning
Abstract (arXiv)
Federated learning (FL) is vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where malicious clients upload manipulated updates to degrade the performance of the global model. Although detection methods can identify and remove malicious clients, the model remains affected. Retraining from scratch is effective but costly, and existing unlearning methods remain unsatisfactory in both effectiveness and efficiency. We propose Federated Adversarial Unlearning (FAUN), a lightweight framework that retains only a short window of malicious clients' updates and employs adversarial optimization on a proxy dataset to derive updates that eliminate malicious directions. Applying these updates for a few unlearning rounds, followed by benign fine-tuning, enables fast removal of malicious effects and stable recovery. Experiments on three canonical datasets show that FAUN achieves recovery comparable to retraining while requiring far fewer rounds and reduces attack success rates to near zero, confirming FAUN successfully eliminates the contributions of unlearned clients.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Federated unlearning and poisoning, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 12 of its 24 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 4 May 2026.
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12 of 24 references.
References · 12
- 2015Deep Residual Learning for Image Recognitioncited by 51,809
- 2019Federated Learning: Challenges, Methods, and Future Directionscited by 1,531
- 2018How To Backdoor Federated Learningcited by 745
- 2019Adversarial Training for Free!cited by 638
- 2019Local Model Poisoning Attacks to Byzantine-Robust Federated Learningcited by 479
- 2018Analyzing Federated Learning through an Adversarial Lenscited by 346
- 2020FLTrust: Byzantine-robust Federated Learning via Trust Bootstrappingcited by 330
- 2019A Little Is Enough: Circumventing Defenses For Distributed Learningcited by 285
- 2022FLDetector: Defending Federated Learning Against Model Poisoning Attacks via Detecting Malicious Clientscited by 119
- 2022MPAF: Model Poisoning Attacks to Federated Learning based on Fake Clientscited by 65
- 2022FedRecover: Recovering from Poisoning Attacks in Federated Learning using Historical Informationcited by 53
- 2019Adversarial Attack Generation Empowered by Min-Max Optimizationcited by 32
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