mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Structural Enforcement of Goal Integrity in AI Agents via Separation-of-Powers Architecture

arXiv 2604.23646 ↗First posted 26 Apr 2026cs.AI cs.CRcited by 1

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

Recent evidence suggests that frontier AI systems can exhibit agentic misalignment, generating and executing harmful actions derived from internally constructed goals, even without explicit user requests. Existing mitigation methods, such as Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) and constitutional prompting, operate primarily at the model level and provide only probabilistic safety guarantees. We propose the Policy-Execution-Authorization (PEA) architecture, a "separation-of-powers" design that enforces safety at the system level. PEA decouples intent generation, authorization, and execution into independent, isolated layers connected via cryptographically constrained capability tokens. We present five core contributions: (C1) an Intent Verification Layer (IVL) for ensuring capability-intent consistency; (C2) Intent Lineage Tracking (ILT), which binds all executable intents to the originating user request via cryptographic anchors; (C3) Goal Drift Detection, which rejects semantically divergent intents below a configurable threshold; (C4) an Output Semantic Gate (OSG) that detects implicit coercion using a structured K × I × P threat calculus (Knowledge, Influence, Policy); and (C5) a formal verification framework proving that goal integrity is maintained even under adversarial model compromise. By shifting agent alignment from a behavioral property to a structurally enforced system constraint, PEA provides a robust foundation for the governance of autonomous agents.

Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 7 of its 25 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 26 Apr 2026.

Builds on

7 of 25 references.

Closest ancestors · 1

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025Agentic Misalignment: How LLMs Could Be Insider Threats5 Oct

Other references · 6

  1. 2017Deep reinforcement learning from human preferencescited by 3,912
  2. 2022Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedbackcited by 3,050
  3. 2018AI safety via debatecited by 400
  4. 2024Alignment faking in large language modelscited by 360
  5. 2024Frontier Models are Capable of In-context Schemingcited by 287
  6. 2022Measuring Progress on Scalable Oversight for Large Language Modelscited by 225

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Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.

1 paper.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

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