mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

enclawed: A Configurable, Sector-Neutral Hardening Framework for Single-User AI Assistant Gateways

arXiv 2604.16838 ↗First posted 18 Apr 2026cs.CR cs.AI cs.MAcited by 2

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Abstract (arXiv)

We present enclawed, a hard-fork hardening framework built on the OpenClaw AI assistant gateway. enclawed targets deployments that need attestable peer trust, deny-by-default external connectivity, signed-module loading, and a tamper-evident audit trail -- typically regulated industries (financial services, healthcare, defense, government). The framework ships in two flavors: an open flavor preserving OpenClaw compatibility while emitting audit, classification, and data-loss-prevention (DLP) signals, and an enclaved flavor activating strict allowlists, FIPS cryptographic-module assertion, mandatory manifest signature verification, and high-assurance peer attestation for the Model Context Protocol. The classification ladder is data-driven: deployers pick from five built-in presets or supply their own JSON. We ship a 356-case test suite (261 unit + 95 adversarial pen-tests) covering tamper detection, signature forgery, egress bypass, audit-log truncation, trust-root mutation, DLP evasion, prompt injection, code injection, and biconditional admission for net-capable extensions; real-time human-in-the-loop control; a memory-bounded transaction buffer with rollback; strict-mode TypeScript typecheck; and a CI workflow. The biconditional extension-admission gate extends the skill trust schema to non-skill extensions. The four-level verification lattice is now closed at the top: four skill-formal-* primitives plus a CLI produce a signed proof-carrying bundle the runtime re-checks at load, raising a skill from tested to formal via static effect-containment, refinement-typed dispatch, and bounded model checking. enclawed is a hardening framework, not an accredited certification; hardware, validated crypto, facilities, and assessor sign-off remain the deployer's responsibility.

Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 10 of its 68 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 18 Apr 2026.

Builds on

10 of 68 references.

References · 10

  1. 2023Efficient Memory Management for Large Language Model Serving with PagedAttentioncited by 5,767
  2. 2020Extracting Training Data from Large Language Modelscited by 2,144
  3. 2023AutoGen: Enabling Next-Gen LLM Applications via Multi-Agent Conversationcited by 1,906
  4. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,339
  5. 2023Llama Guard: LLM-based Input-Output Safeguard for Human-AI Conversationscited by 1,124
  6. 2023SGLang: Efficient Execution of Structured Language Model Programscited by 1,107
  7. 2022Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Modelscited by 760
  8. 2023Scalable Extraction of Training Data from (Production) Language Modelscited by 415
  9. 2023NeMo Guardrails: A Toolkit for Controllable and Safe LLM Applications with Programmable Railscited by 347
  10. 2023Ignore This Title and HackAPrompt: Exposing Systemic Vulnerabilities of LLMs through a Global Scale Prompt Hacking Competitioncited by 65

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Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 2.

2 papers.

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  1. 2026A Security Analysis of the OpenClaw AI Agent Framework
  2. 2026OpenClaw PRISM: A Zero-Fork, Defense-in-Depth Runtime Security Layer for Tool-Augmented LLM Agents
  3. 2026Clawdrain: Exploiting Tool-Calling Chains for Stealthy Token Exhaustion in OpenClaw Agents
  4. 2026Your Agent, Their Asset: A Real-World Safety Analysis of OpenClaw
  5. 2026Trojan's Whisper: Stealthy Manipulation of OpenClaw through Injected Bootstrapped Guidance
  6. 2026Recognition Without Enforcement: Configuration-Dependent Failures in LLM Agent Instruction Arbitration and External Control
  7. 2026Constraining Host-Level Abuse in Self-Hosted Computer-Use Agents via TEE-Backed Isolation
  8. 2026Agent-Fence: Mapping Security Vulnerabilities Across Deep Research Agents