Activation Steering for Aligned Open-ended Generation without Sacrificing Coherence
On the map: LLM safety and security → Safety alignment, refusal and guardrails
also in 1 more
Abstract (arXiv)
Alignment in LLMs is more brittle than commonly assumed: misalignment can be induced by adversarial prompts, benign fine-tuning, emergent misalignment, and goal misgeneralization. Recent evidence suggests that some misalignment behaviors are encoded as linear structure in activation space, making it tractable via activation steering, which could be used as a lightweight runtime defense. We implement three methods: Steer-With-Fixed-Coefficient (SwFC), which applies uniform additive steering, and two novel projection-aware methods, Steer-to-Target-Projection (StTP) and Steer-to-Mirror-Projection (StMP), that use a logistic regression decision boundary to selectively intervene only on tokens whose activations fall below the threshold. We evaluate these methods on two threat models, dishonesty and dismissiveness, using malicious system prompts as a controlled proxy for misalignment. We conduct our experiments on two architectures (Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct and Qwen3.6-27B). All methods substantially recover alignment. StTP and StMP preserve general capabilities (MMLU, MT-Bench, AlpacaEval) better than uniform steering. Finally, we show that our honesty steering generalizes to out-of-distribution scenarios: a single honesty direction extracted from the aligned model significantly raises scores on the MASK benchmark, suppresses deception in multi-agent settings (Among Us), doubles the hidden-behavior discovery rate on AuditBench, and restores honesty in an emergently misaligned model.
Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Safety alignment, refusal and guardrails, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 48 of its 57 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 9 Apr 2026.
Builds on
48 of 57 references.
Closest ancestors · 8
Same direction, newest first
- 2026Steering Externalities: Benign Activation Steering Unintentionally Increases Jailbreak Risk for Large Language Models3 Feb
- 2025The Rogue Scalpel: Activation Steering Compromises LLM Safety26 Sep
- 2025AlphaSteer: Learning Refusal Steering with Principled Null-Space Constraint8 Jun
- 2025Emergent Misalignment: Narrow finetuning can produce broadly misaligned LLMs24 Feb
- 2024Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Direction17 Jun
- 2024Safety Alignment Should Be Made More Than Just a Few Tokens Deep10 Jun
- 2024Improving Alignment and Robustness with Circuit Breakers6 Jun
- 2023Fine-tuning Aligned Language Models Compromises Safety, Even When Users Do Not Intend To!5 Oct
Other references · 40
- 2024The Llama 3 Herd of Modelscited by 14,715
- 2025Qwen3 Technical Reportcited by 8,820
- 2023Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arenacited by 8,626
- 2020Measuring Massive Multitask Language Understandingcited by 7,963
- 2023Efficient Memory Management for Large Language Model Serving with PagedAttentioncited by 5,944
- 2022Training a Helpful and Harmless Assistant with Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedbackcited by 3,720
- 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Modelscited by 3,104
- 2023Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?cited by 1,651
- 2023Representation Engineering: A Top-Down Approach to AI Transparencycited by 1,336
- 2023Inference-Time Intervention: Eliciting Truthful Answers from a Language Modelcited by 1,302
- 2023Steering Llama 2 via Contrastive Activation Additioncited by 1,085
- 2024Length-Controlled AlpacaEval: A Simple Way to Debias Automatic Evaluatorscited by 897
28 more
- 2023The Linear Representation Hypothesis and the Geometry of Large Language Modelscited by 716
- 2024Justice or Prejudice? Quantifying Biases in LLM-as-a-Judgecited by 368
- 2022The Alignment Problem from a Deep Learning Perspectivecited by 258
- 2025AxBench: Steering LLMs? Even Simple Baselines Outperform Sparse Autoencoderscited by 218
- 2024Not All Language Model Features Are One-Dimensionally Linearcited by 212
- 2024Programming Refusal with Conditional Activation Steeringcited by 206
- 2025Constitutional Classifiers: Defending against Universal Jailbreaks across Thousands of Hours of Red Teamingcited by 181
- 2024Latent Adversarial Training Improves Robustness to Persistent Harmful Behaviors in LLMscited by 173
- 2022Goal Misgeneralization: Why Correct Specifications Aren't Enough For Correct Goalscited by 126
- 2021Goal Misgeneralization in Deep Reinforcement Learningcited by 123
- 2023Mechanistically analyzing the effects of fine-tuning on procedurally defined taskscited by 115
- 2024Efficient Adversarial Training in LLMs with Continuous Attackscited by 113
- 2024InferAligner: Inference-Time Alignment for Harmlessness through Cross-Model Guidancecited by 83
- 2025The MASK Benchmark: Disentangling Honesty From Accuracy in AI Systemscited by 72
- 2025Convergent Linear Representations of Emergent Misalignmentcited by 71
- 2024Semantics-Adaptive Activation Intervention for LLMs via Dynamic Steering Vectorscited by 63
- 2025Multi-Attribute Steering of Language Models via Targeted Interventioncited by 46
- 2025AdaSteer: Your Aligned LLM is Inherently an Adaptive Jailbreak Defendercited by 38
- 2026AuditBench: Evaluating Alignment Auditing Techniques on Models with Hidden Behaviorscited by 38
- 2024Towards Reliable Evaluation of Behavior Steering Interventions in LLMscited by 36
- 2025One-shot Optimized Steering Vectors Mediate Safety-relevant Behaviors in LLMscited by 29
- 2025Among Us: A Sandbox for Measuring and Detecting Agentic Deceptioncited by 26
- 2025Persistent Instability in LLM's Personality Measurements: Effects of Scale, Reasoning, and Conversation Historycited by 26
- 2026There Is More to Refusal in Large Language Models than a Single Directioncited by 26
- 2024Jailbreak Antidote: Runtime Safety-Utility Balance via Sparse Representation Adjustment in Large Language Modelscited by 23
- 2025Representation Engineering for Large-Language Models: Survey and Research Challengescited by 21
- 2025PIXEL: Adaptive Steering Via Position-wise Injection with eXact Estimated Levels under Subspace Calibrationcited by 11
- 2025In-Distribution Steering: Balancing Control and Coherence in Language Model Generationcited by 9
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 4.
4 papers.
- 2026Position: Collusion Risks Among AI Reasoning Agents Justify Certification Requirements for Making Market Decisionscited by 1
- 2026SteerCheck: Attribution Specificity and Alignment Leakage in Activation-Steering Auditscited by 1
- 2026The Agent Knew: Internal States Forecast Unauthorized Actions and Stop Them, and the Lies That Followcited by 0
- 2026Model vs. User: Whose Values Prevail? Inference-Time Value Alignment in Multi-Turn Conversationscited by 0
- 2026Model vs. User: Whose Values Prevail? Inference-Time Value Alignment in Multi-Turn Conversations14 Oct 2026
- 2026The Agent Knew: Internal States Forecast Unauthorized Actions and Stop Them, and the Lies That Follow12 Oct 2026
- 2026SteerCheck: Attribution Specificity and Alignment Leakage in Activation-Steering Audits25 Aug 2026
- 2026Position: Collusion Risks Among AI Reasoning Agents Justify Certification Requirements for Making Market Decisions29 May 2026
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026Activation Steering Induces Emergent Misalignment: A More Comprehensive Evaluation
- 2026The Art of (Mis)alignment: How Fine-Tuning Methods Effectively Misalign and Realign LLMs in Post-Training
- 2024SCANS: Mitigating the Exaggerated Safety for LLMs via Safety-Conscious Activation Steering
- 2026Feature Elicitation for SAE Steering of Deceptive Behaviour in Small LLMs
- 2025Probing the Robustness of Large Language Models Safety to Latent Perturbations
- 2025Re-Emergent Misalignment: How Narrow Fine-Tuning Erodes Safety Alignment in LLMs
- 2025Meta SecAlign: A Secure Foundation LLM Against Prompt Injection Attacks
- 2026Selective Steering: Norm-Preserving Control Through Discriminative Layer Selection