mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Steering Externalities: Benign Activation Steering Unintentionally Increases Jailbreak Risk for Large Language Models

arXiv 2602.04896 ↗First posted 3 Feb 2026cs.CR cs.AIcited by 8

On the map: LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation → Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks

also in 1 more
Abstract (arXiv)

Activation steering is a practical post-training model alignment technique to enhance the utility of Large Language Models (LLMs). Prior to deploying a model as a service, developers can steer a pre-trained model toward specific behavioral objectives, such as compliance or instruction adherence, without the need for retraining. This process is as simple as adding a steering vector to the model's internal representations. However, this capability unintentionally introduces critical and under-explored safety risks. We identify a phenomenon termed Steering Externalities, where steering vectors derived from entirely benign datasets-such as those enforcing strict compliance or specific output formats like JSON-inadvertently erode safety guardrails. Experiments reveal that these interventions act as a force multiplier, creating new vulnerabilities to jailbreaks and increasing attack success rates to over 80% on standard benchmarks by bypassing the initial safety alignment. Ultimately, our results expose a critical blind spot in deployment: benign activation steering systematically erodes the "safety margin," rendering models more vulnerable to black-box attacks and proving that inference-time utility improvements must be rigorously audited for unintended safety externalities.

Key facts. Cited by 8 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks, one of 10 directions in LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation. Builds on 21 of its 30 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 3 Feb 2026.

Builds on

21 of 30 references.

Closest ancestors · 3

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2024Safety Alignment Should Be Made More Than Just a Few Tokens Deep10 Jun
  2. 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models27 Jul
  3. 2023BeaverTails: Towards Improved Safety Alignment of LLM via a Human-Preference Dataset10 Jul

Other references · 18

  1. 2024The Llama 3 Herd of Modelscited by 14,192
  2. 2023LLaMA: Open and Efficient Foundation Language Modelscited by 13,958
  3. 2022Training a Helpful and Harmless Assistant with Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedbackcited by 3,634
  4. 2024HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusalcited by 1,330
  5. 2023Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queriescited by 1,326
  6. 2023Instruction-Following Evaluation for Large Language Modelscited by 1,143
  7. 2021A General Language Assistant as a Laboratory for Alignmentcited by 1,023
  8. 2024Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Directioncited by 960
  9. 2023Steering Language Models With Activation Engineeringcited by 824
  10. 2023Tree of Attacks: Jailbreaking Black-Box LLMs Automaticallycited by 619
  11. 2024When Scaling Meets LLM Finetuning: The Effect of Data, Model and Finetuning Methodcited by 201
  12. 2024Programming Refusal with Conditional Activation Steeringcited by 191
6 more
  1. 2024AutoDAN-Turbo: A Lifelong Agent for Strategy Self-Exploration to Jailbreak LLMscited by 185
  2. 2024Preference Fine-Tuning of LLMs Should Leverage Suboptimal, On-Policy Datacited by 184
  3. 2024Improving Instruction-Following in Language Models through Activation Steeringcited by 149
  4. 2024Unintentional Unalignment: Likelihood Displacement in Direct Preference Optimizationcited by 66
  5. 2025The Rogue Scalpel: Activation Steering Compromises LLM Safetycited by 18
  6. 2025CoP: Agentic Red-teaming for Large Language Models using Composition of Principlescited by 11

Built on by

Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 8.

8 papers.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2025AdaSteer: Your Aligned LLM is Inherently an Adaptive Jailbreak Defender
  2. 2024SCANS: Mitigating the Exaggerated Safety for LLMs via Safety-Conscious Activation Steering
  3. 2025Activation Approximations Can Incur Safety Vulnerabilities Even in Aligned LLMs: Comprehensive Analysis and Defense
  4. 2025Why Safeguarded Ships Run Aground? Aligned Large Language Models' Safety Mechanisms Tend to Be Anchored in The Template Region
  5. 2025Probing the Robustness of Large Language Models Safety to Latent Perturbations
  6. 2023Trojan Activation Attack: Red-Teaming Large Language Models using Activation Steering for Safety-Alignment
  7. 2026Understanding and Preserving Safety in Fine-Tuned LLMs
  8. 2026Safety Paradox: How Enhanced Safety Awareness Leaves LLMs Vulnerable to Posterior Attack